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This study is concerned with the analysis 0£ several types of 
attributions made by persons in a competitive situation, and with 
examining the relationships between these several types 0£ attri-
butions. In an attempt to systematically extend attribution 
theory to situations in which predictions are made, a predictive 
attribution model was formulated. This model is an extension and 
elaboration 0£ an attribution model developed by Kelley (1967, 
1971, 1972, 1973). The primary objective is to determine to what 
extent the basic cognitive processes underlying predictive attri-
.but~ons parallels those 0£ postdictive attributions. This model 
includes the perceived personality traits 0£ the actor as a 
critical dimension in the assignment 0£ causality £or an event. 
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Personality science is at a critical stage in its development 
and is currently experiencing intra-area conflict. This conflict 
is broadly outlined as a disagreement between dynamic (i.e., 
psychoanalytic and intrapsychic approaches) and behavioral em-
phases, between clinician and experimentalist, between medical 
models and social models. Not only has theory been involved in 
this conflict, but also models of man, assessment and diagnostic 
techniques and theory validation strategies. Theories of personal-
ity are abundant (see Hall & Lindzey, 1970; Bischof, 1970) and 
still forthcoming.(Mischel, 1973b); data is plentiful and increas-
ing at a tremendous rate (reflected in the additional journals in 
.the area of experimental research in personality). However, the 
viability of many theories (particularly, trait and state theories) 
has been seriously challenged, because the data provides little 
empirical support (Mischel, 1968). This current incongruity be-
tween data and theory has challenged some to question traditional 
concepts of personality. Traditional personality science has 
approached its limits, unless personality is reconceptualized. 
A brief literature exists which suggests that personality may 
better be conceived of as observer perceptions than actor disposi-
tions. Traditional theories of personality conceptualize "traits" 
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as "any enduring or persisting character or characteristic of a 
person by means of which he can be distinguished from another; 
that about a person which is consistently manifested, despite 
variations within a considerable range of circumstances'' (English 
& English, 1958, p. 560). However, Mischel (1968) has reviewed 
evidence which suggests that past behavior is the best indicator 
of future behavior, instead of traits and dispositions as deter-
minants of behavior as traditionally assumed. 
The present conceptualization of personality as perceptions 
will pull together a divergent literature which has specific im-
plications or arguments for the conceptualization: implicit per-
sonality theory (Cronbach, 1955; Schneider, 1973), attribution 
theory (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1967, 
1971, 1972, 1973; Nisbett,~ al., 1973), and personal construct 
theory (Kelly, 1955). Traits are redefined as verbal cognitive 
summary labels, rather than underlying intrapsychic dynamics 
(Mischel, 1973b). Hypotheses derived from these arguments will 




Personality -- A Science in Conflict 
The conflict is apparent, first of all, in the numerousity 
of personality definitions. Ledford Bischof (1970, p. 7) des-
cribed an episode in his graduate education in which he compiled 
a list of 73 different definitions of personality, each with its 
particular implications for psychotherapy. The lack of a general-
ly accepted definition has not helped to unify a divergent theo-
retical literature. 
A second issue or source of conflict deals with the relative 
efficacy of clinical versus statistical or actuarial prediction of 
psychotherapy prognosis and outcome (Meehl, 1954). The relative 
inefficiency of traditional theory and therapy has undermined 
continued development of the traditional approach. 
The third major conflict, the most heated and most current, 
is a battle of models; intrapsychic versus environmental, dynamic 
versus behavioral, medical versus learning, traditional versus 
social. This conflict involves different conceptions of personal-
ity, divergent assumptions (methodological and theoretical), rad-
ically different therapy techniques, incompatible validation 
procedures, and different personality assessment techniques. 
Goldfried and Kent (1972) and Mischel (1973a) have cogently 
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articulated the two positions on these issues. Although both en-
tertain the same goal (the prediction of human behavior), the 
general approaches differ. The traditional approach has concerned 
itself with understanding the underlying personality character-
istics or traits as .predictors of the individual's behavior. 
These underlying irpersonality structure" components consist of 
(depending upon one's particular theoretical orientation) rtdrives," 
"needs,n 1ttraits,1t "states, 1r "types,•t or similar constructs. 
Since these inferred characteristics function as determinants and 
precipitators of behavior, the proper prediction of overt behavior 
is based on assessment of the underlying psychic determinants. 
In contradistinction, a behavioral model :focuses on human 
behavior, what he "does" rather than what he "has" or 11 is.n The 
behavior is viewed as a response to specific environmental events. 
Thus human behavior is a function of prior social learning, of 
present environmental stimuli and environmental reactions to the 
behavior. Mischel (1968) reviewed the existing literature and 
concluded that the best predictor of behavior is not knowledge of 
traits or states, but knowledge of past behavior. His conclusion 
initiated an exchance of rhetoric between himself and Wachtel 
(Mischel, 1973a; Wachtel, 1973a, 1973b) over the relative merits 
and liabilities of the traditional and behavioral approaches. 
However, Jaccard (1974) suggests that prediction of social be-
havior is possible from personality traits provided the behavior 
criteria are delineated and personality measures systematically 
related to multiple act criteria. The professional interest in 
this issue indicates that the issue is far from resolved. 
Personality Science -- A Brief History 
Any consideration of the history of personality theory is 
dominated by the impact of one man. The stature of Sigmund 
Freud's contribution has been so dominating that it is suggested 
that any consideration of personality theory either begins or 
.ends with Freud, such that he is usually considered the 11 grand-
fathern of personality theory. Since Freud's initial conceptual-
ization of personality dynamics in the period between 1890 and 
1900, two broad historical trends are noted (admittedly, this is 
an oversimplification). 
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The historical tendency to be first noticed is the movement 
from intrapersonal theorie~ to interpersonal theories (from Freud, 
Adler, and Jung to Horney, Sullivan and Leary; still staying with-
in a somewhat psychiatric and medical orientation). As time has 
passed, more and more attention has been paid to the en~ironmental 
and social forces influencing personality development. Within the 
interpersonal interaction concept of personality, personality is 
defined as occurring within a dyadic interchange. Carson (1969) 
has provided an excellent review of the interpersonal interaction 
concepts of personality. 
A second movement in general emphasis reflects the broaden-
· ing of conceptualization from clinical, abnormal and maladaptive 
to normal and adaptive. This movement occurred as academicians 
(both medical school personnel and experimentally trained psycho-
logists) began to research personality development and formulate 
explicit theories. As the private practicianer's influence (i.e., 
Frued, Jung, Adler, Horney, Moreno, etc.) succumbed to rapid ad-
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vancement by the academic types {Murray, Sullivan, Mowrer, Rogers, 
Allport, Murphy, Cattell, Eysenck, Lewin, Maslow, and Kelly), the 
field concerned itself with abnormality and its therapy, but also 
became concerned with the development of the normal, functioning 
person. The movement switched from pure preoccupation with heal-
ing dis-eases to mental health. Even within the academic concern, 
an increasingly active involvement is noted by the experimental 
social psychologists (i.e., Mischel, 1968, 1971, 1973a, ~973b; and 
Byrne, 1974) in what was a primarily clinical domination. All 
these movements, trends, and re-emphases are reflective of the un-
settled state of personality science. 
Personality Science -- Limits to Growth 
Fiske (1974, p. 1) has charged that: 
(t)he conventional science of personality is 
close to its limits. No major, generally-accepted ad-
vances have been made in recent years. In fact, neither 
investigators nor theorists have much consensus on 
anything. 
The growth of conventional personality science is limited by sev-
eral factors. The first is what Fiske (1974, p. 1) calls ''the 
reliance on words." The same label for a concept often involves 
two or more descriptively divergent definitions; the same label 
describes two different phenomena. Or in the instances in which 
the same definition relates to the use of the label, the opera-
' tional definitions and procedures only approximate each other. 
The second source of limitation is in the nature of the data. 
Fiske (1974, p. 1) contends that: 
. (c)onventional personality relies on attributed 
gualities which are cognized or derived from a conglom-
erate of particular observations. Each datum is~ judg-
ment of an observer who is summarizing or otherwise com-
biningand interpreting his perceptions of the person 
being described. (The emphases are ours.) 
Thus, in traditional personality and assessment situations, we 
have a three component system: (1) the behaving actor (usually 
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the patient or client), (2) an observer (the therapist-clinician), 
and (3) the diagnosis, assessment, prognosis, dispositional 
statement, or attributed characteristic given to the actor by the 
observer. Thus, the datum reflects as much the observer's cogni-
tive reconstruction of the environmental events as it does the 
actor's behavior. Traditional clinical psychology has expended 
much time and effort into devising a system in which the multi-
plicity of actor behaviors is accurately mapped into the proper 
diagnostic label (see DSM-II}. This label (often assumed to de-
note a ~al underlying trait) provides the basis for prognostic 
statements and treatment regiments. However, little research and 
conceptualization have occurred which explore the clinician's 
cognitive and inferential processes through which the labels are 
generated. One exception is the syllogistic-probabilistic model 
formulated by Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960). 
The third major limitation is the inoperative feedback loop 
from the data to hypothesis and theory. Even when the investiga-
tor fails to reject the null hypothesis, the major concepts and 
theoretical notions remain full blown. Apart from this problem is 
the tendency of the researcher to jump from operational definition 
to fully blown concepts without systematic replication {Sidman, 
1960) of the operational definition. Fiske (1974, p. 3) aptly 
summarizes, 
The preoccupation with global variables and the gap be-
tween concepts and observations are so marked that con-
. cepts are not modified when empirical findings are 
inconsistent with the statements about the concepts. 
Beliefs in concepts are not shaken by disconfirming re-
sults from studies designed to test them. 
He continues, 
. . . The reliance on complex judgments by observers and 
the adherence to global concepts unrestricted by link-
ages to concrete operations will persist until new method-
ologies and conceptual frameworks have been produced and 
have been empirically shown to provide a more adequate 
body of systematic knowledge about the behavior we strive 
to understand. 
Three possible trends for future development were noted by 
Fiske (1974). These include: personality as naturalistic mole-
cular acts, personality as experimental observation, and person-
ality as perceptions. However, it would seem that in the first 
two approaches, though the reliance upon judgmental and inferen-
tial processes is diminished, it is not avoided. And to the ex-
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tent to which these processes still exist in these new approaches, 
to .that extent they are doomed or limited for the reasons already 
discussed. For these and other reasons to be specified, it is 
advocated that personality be reconsidered as perceptions: per-
sonality refers to observer judgmental characteristics and the 
subsequent labels rather than actor dispositions and underlying 
dynamics. Defining personality in this fashion allows us to ac-
count for the wealth (sheer numerousity of personality theories), 
a datum which current and traditional personality science is re-
miss to do. Jones and Nisbett (1971, p. 89) posit, " .•. traits 
exist more in the eye of the beholder than in the psyche of the 
actor.'' It is the implications of this general approach the 
author wishes to pursue. 
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Implicit and Explicit Theories 
Psychologists are not the only ones to have theories of per-
sonality. Each person has some implicit theory of why· persons be-
have as they do, and this implicit assumption about the relation 
of traits to each other was termed "implicit personality theory" 
by Bruner and Tagiuri (1954). This assumed relationship between 
traits is termed "implici t't, because the person is largely uncon-
scious of this assumed relationship and unable to articulate very 
precisely this relationship. 
Cronbach (1955) defined implicit personality theory in quasi-
statistical terms. When an observer makes predictions about or 
describes a large number of actors, these predictions or points 
define a distribution. The mean is regarded as a stereotype, the 
variance indicates the degree to which the observer differentiates 
among actors on the given dimension, while covariances represent 
the expected relationship among traits. Thus, the means, vari-
ances, and covariances describe the observer's implicit theory 0£ 
personality. 
Since Cronbach's article, the research in implicit personal-
ity theory has been active and sophisticated. In his review 0£ 
the topic, D. J. Schneider (1973, p. 307) summarized the area in 
the following manner, 1tThe sophistication 0£ method is greater 
than the sophistication of the substantitive questions" or answers,. 
Schneider's comments are particularly relevant to a nomothetic 
approach. The nomothetic approach is characteristically used in 
attempts to determine the structural components 0£ implicit theory 
(Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972), while the idiographic approach uses 
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the individual's theory structure and its relation to environment-
al events to specify the process by which the individual acquired 
his particular theory. Rosenburg and Jones (1972) have taken an 
idiographic approach in their analysis of the implicit personality 
theory of the novelist, Theodore Dreiser, and related his view of 
persons and customary descriptive phrases to his life experiences. 
This idiographic approach may be a fruitful and insightful inquiry 
and offers a possibility of intergrating implicit personality and 
explicit (traditional) personality theory. 
Bischof (1970) explicitly discusses nineteen theories of per-
sonality, while Hall and Lindzey (1970) considered seventeen, and 
other exist (Leary, 1957; Carson, 1969; and Mischel, 1973b). An 
interesting piece of data these traditional theories have no ac-
count for is the multiplicity or numerousity of theories. How do 
we explain the continued proliferation of theories? Are personal-
ity theories convenient fictions, or are some true and accurate 
~t the expense of others? Is personality such a pervasive and com-
plex phenomena that several separate theories are needed to ade-
quately handle the phenomena? Or is there another way to account 
for this continued proliferation of theories? 
It is suggested that an idiographic approach to implicit per-
sonality theory can account for this relatively neglected data, 
pointing out common components in the formation of a theory of why 
persons behave as they do. All persons (whether a personality 
theorist or a layman) acquire their particular theory of personal-
ity as a result of personal experience with others, and their 
attempts to determine the cause of the other's behavior. Attribu-
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ting transsituational consistency to others (whether or not it 
actually exists) permits the observer to anticipate and predict 
the other's behavior. All observers (layman and theorist, alike) 
derive their fundamental concepts and labels to be applied to 
others through training (formal and informal) and interaction 
with others, and their attempt to account for the cause of the 
other's behavior as consistently and efficiently as possible. Be-
cause of the diversity of experience, situational requirements, 
demands and constraints, and training, th~re exist a multiplicity 
of assumptions about causal dispositions. The major difference 
between an implicit and explicit theory is that.the traditional 
personality theorist had motivation, ability, training, and oppor-
tunity to become more aware of how he viewed persons, and was per-
mitted to test these hypotheses more precisely, clinically or 
experimentally, than most persons. 
An Observer Model of Personality 
Previously, we have shown that conventional personality 
science is in a precarious position, has reached its limits, and 
indicated a potential reorganization of personality theory, es-
pecially concerning the relationship between conventional and 
implicit personality approaches. It is often easy to criticize, 
to downgrade, or to dismiss a theory as null, void, or useless, 
but it is more difficult and more noble to initiate changes which 
amend or reconstruct those foundations where were torn down. It 
is felt that attribution theory (Jones, et al., 1972; Kelley, 
1967, 1973) holds the potential for unifying and making sense of 
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personality, given the failure of the conventional approach. 
Attribution theory and research grew out of Heider's (1958) 
ttnaive" psychology, or psychology by the layman. It is held here 
that the psychology of the layman isnodifferent than the psycho-
logy of the psychologist, with the possible exception that psycho-
logists have had a more explicit opportunity to test their view of 
man. Jones, et al. (1972, p. x) define attribution theory as that 
ntheory (which) deals with the rule the average individual uses in 
attempting to infer the causes of observed behavior • 1r Thus, it is 
the cause-effect analyses of behavior made by the man in the 
street. Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972, 1973) has formulated an ANOVA 
model, an analogy of which the layman uses when determining cause-
effect relationships. His basic proposition is that causality 
will be assigned to or attributed to the cause (in a multiplicity 
of potential causes) with which the effect covaries. That is, 
rteffects are attributed to those causal factors with which they 
uniquely covary than to those of which they are relatively inde-
pendenttt (Kelley, 1972, p. 151). In this ANOVA model, the salient 
possible causes constitute the independent variables, and the ef-
fects comprise the dependent variables. For many attribution 
problems, the classes of possible causes are persons, entities, 
and times/modalities. Figure 1 provides a pictorial representa-
tion of this model. 
One implication of the ANOVA model is that ~ot all patterns 
of data will be equally easy to interpret. If a certain effect 
was always observed in the presence of Person Pl, across times/ 















' Figure 1. Postdictive Attribution ANOVA Model 
(from Kelley, 1967) -- Data dimen-
sions are represented by capital 




would be noted; and Pl would be attributed personal responsibility 
or causality. In the main effect, a specific effect is due to a 
particular person or entity. An Entity x Person pattern (interac-
tion) indicates a special affinity between the person and the ob-
ject. As the data pattern becomes more ambiguous, causal attribu-
tions become less specific; no explanation for the effect may come 
to mind. 
Another implication of the ANOVA model is what Kell~y (1973, 
p. 112) calls the "phenomenology of attribution validity," and 
describes it in these words~ 
I know that my response to a particular stimulus is 
a valid one if (a) my response is associated distinct-
ively with the stimulus, (b) my response is similar 
to those made by other persons to the same stimulus 
(there is consensus), and (c) my response is consist-
ent over time -- or successive exposure to the 
-stimulus and as I interact with it by means of dif-
ferent sensory and perceptual modalities. 
These three validity criteria -- distinctiveness, consensus, 
and consistency -- serve as an index of the individual's level of 
information. A ratio, analogous to F in ANOVA, is provided by 
the ratio of between-entity distinctions which the individual is 
making to the within-entity variance among his and other person 
responses. Both increased distinctiveness, increased consensus, 
along with increased consistency (decreased variability) in data 
patterns increases one's confidence in causal attributions. 
Attribution processes are involved in at least two contexts 
or under two different task demands; each of these contexts 
(though related) involves a distinct model. Traditional attribu-
tion (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1973; 
McArthur, 1972; Ruble, 1973; Storms, 1973} tasks are largely 
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postdictive. The attributor seeks to determine the cause (either 
internal intentional and dispositional factors, or external situ-
ational contingencies) of past events after the event has occur-
red. The attributor infers probable causes from observed effects. 
This is the task conceptualized in Kelley's ANOVA model. 
However, in real life circumstances, humans also engage in 
attributions tasks that are not exclusively postdictive enter-
prizes. Each person enters situations with specific expectations 
(based on causal schemata), and is able to make cert~in predict-
ions about the situation, future behavior, or other aspects of 
the person being obs~rved. He clearly is involved in predictive 
or anticipatory attributions. He reasons from known possible 
causes to probable effects. Prediction (at least reasonably ac-
curate and valid prediction) is simply impossible without prior 
information and past experience experience about the situation, 
and information about the personality traits, intentions, motives, 
and emotions of the observed. 
Causal schemata provide this type of information to the at-
tributor. Kelley (1972, p. 151) defines causal schema as: 
. a conception of the manner in which two or more 
causal factors interact in relation to a particular 
kind· of effect. A schema is derived from experience 
in observing cause and effect relationships, from 
experiments in which deliberate control has been 
exercised over causal factors, and from implicit and 
explicit teachings about the causal structure of the 
world. It enables a person to perform certain opera-
tions with limited information and thereby to reach 
certain conclusions or inferences as to causation. 
These causal schemata are summarized in the observer in an 
ANOVA design, but because we are concerned with making predictions 
of effects from known causes Kelley's ANOVA model has been 
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modified, as shown in Figure 2. As compared to the postdictive 
model (Figure 1), perceptions of traits have replaced time and 
modality factors as "consistency" data, and perceptions of the 
situation have replaced entities as "distinctiveness" data. Both 
models consider consensus across persons. 
Behavior clearly occurs in a context or situation, and these 
situations vary along a dimension of distinctiveness. Traits are 
the observed or attributed consistency of interpersonal behaviors 
occurring in past experience with others, or through learning, and 
these attributed consistencies are summarized by means of verbal 
labels. These labels or traits are the personal constructs 
(Kell~, 1955) or major dimensions of the observer's implicit per-
sonality theory. They. are the beliefs and values an observer at-
tributes to an actor (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). The observer, by 
assuming consistency in other's behavior, reduces perceived un-
certainty and ambiguity, and facilitates prediction. These at-
tributed traits also enable us to communicate our evaluation of 
a person to another. 
If one assumes another is consistent, then anticipating his 
behavior becomes an easier task. The implication of our model is 
that traits are similar to Kelley's dimension of "times/modali-
ties." Not only is each person aware of his own behavior as a 
function of dispositions and specific situations, but also has a 
schema for specific others. This three dimensional ANOVA matrix 
enables the observer to predict his own and other person's be-
havior or to attribute other personal characteristics. If, across 
several traits and situations, the others behave as self does, 
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Figure 2. Predictive Attribution ANOVA Model --
Data dimensions are represented by 
capital letters, while small let-
ters denote validity dimensions. 
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then there is consensus. As in postdictive attributions, the 
validity and accuracy of predictive attributions is a £unction of 
distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus. 
The Actor - Observer Divergence 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) have proposed that "there is a per-
vasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situ-
ational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same 
actions to stable personal dispositions . 11· A number of investiga-
tors have also demonstrated this trend (McArthur, 1972; Nisbett, 
et al., 1973; Ruble, 1973). Jones and Nisbett (1971) posit that 
two distinct processes account for this divergence. They argue 
that actors and observers have different information sources. 
Actors have direct access to experiential information (the figure 
in a figure-ground context), while observers simply see behavior 
(the figure) against the environmental background (the ground). 
Thus in Kelley's terms, the actors have more of the distinctive-
ness and consistency information through knowledge of his own 
history and direct perception of environmental stimuli. 
They argue furthur that this divergence is also related to 
differences in information processing. 11Di££erent aspects 0£ the 
available information are salient £or actors and observers and 
this differential salience affects the course and outcome of the 
attribution",(Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 85.). However, Averill 
(1973) argues that this difference in information processing is 
not needed to explain the actor-observer attributional divergence, 
that given the different data bases, this alone is sufficient to 
19 
account for the divergence. 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) based their proposition upon data 
gathered when the outcome was blameworthy (i.e., a bad experience, 
failure, etc.). They then suggested that possibly under note-
worthy outcome conditions, the actors and observers may reverse 
their attributions. In this perceived self-concept hypothesis, 
actors would attribute responsibility for success to themselves, 
rather than to situational determinants. 
Attributions for Success and Failure 
Weiner (Weiner, et al., 1971) has argued that the attribu-
tion of causality for success or failure rests primarily upon two 
dimensions: (1) the perceived stability of cause (fixed or vari-
able), and (2) the perceived locus of causality (internal or ex-
ternal). These two dimensions yield a 2 x 2 matrix, which is 
summarized in Figure 3. 
Weiner, et al. (1971) contended that if locus of causality is 
perceived to be internal {that is, personality responsibility or 
causality), and is also perceived to be a stable cause, the cause 
of the outcome is attributed to the person's ability. If the out-
come is attributed to the situation and that cause is stable, then 
the~ difficulty or easiness is attributed as cause for the out-
come. If the cause is unstable or variable, and the locus is 
internal or external, then the cause would be attributed to effort 
or luck, respectively. 
Ruble (1973) examined the relationship between outcomes (suc-
















Figure 3. Attributional Causes for Outcomes (from Weiner, 
et al., 1971) 
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employing scenarios. He found that in both success and failure 
conditions, observers attributed greater causality to the actor 
21 
than actors did to themselves. In fact, he found this divergence 
to be greater in the successful outcome condition, thus extending 
the Jones and Nisbett proposition to noteworthy outcomes. Ruble 
(1973) also noted a tendency for subjects to attribute success to 
stable factors and failure to unstable factors. 
Statement of the Problem 
Much of the attribution research has relied on scenario-
derived data. Admittedly, scenarios are a weak form of experi-
mental manipulation and control (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968) and 
provide little incentive for subjects to be personally ego-in-
volved. If attribution theory is as convincing as it purports 
to be, then it also should be able to account for laboratory 
manipulations. This study will examine the actor-observer di-
vergence and attributions of causality for winning (success) and 
losing (failure) in a laboratory skill strategy game, without the 
use of confederates, robots, or any other deception tactic. 
One major empirical concern here is to determine the extent 
to which predictive attributions correspond with the processes of 
postdictive attributions. It is reasoned that they should paral-
lel closely, because of the stability of causal schemata. Kelley 
(1972) has argued that the causal schemata begin developing as 
early as Piaget's concrete operational stage, which Piaget sug-
gests begins at about age 7 years. In this state, the child be-
gins formulating causal relations involving concrete concepts or 
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physical objects. As the school years pass, he develops causal 
schemata with progressively more abstract concepts, until he en-
ters the formal operational stage at about age 13. In this for-
mal operational stage, the person begins adult~type thinking: he 
is capable of thinking about thinking, and thinking about causal-
ity apart from the actual objects involved. If subjects in this 
study average a conservative estimate of 19 years, then each has 
had at least 12 years of experience in determining causaL rela-
tions and predictions with concrete objects, and 6 years experi-
ence with abstract causality. With 12 years experience, the sin-
gle hour that the subject is participating in this laboratory 
study should have little impact on previously established patterns 
of causal relations. For this reason, we assume a stability of 
causal schemata. (This study was not designed to modify or teach 
causal relations, but to determine the extent to which predictions 
and predicted: causality locus parallel assessment of causality 
after the event.) The following predictions or hypotheses are 
advanced relative to both predictive and postdictive attributions. 
To determine if outcome (predicted or actual) really made an 
impact on the subject, the manipulation will be checked by having 
the subject rate his outcome and the other's outcome on an unsuc-
cessful-successful dimension. An outcome by viewpoint interaction 
is anticipated, and the data pattern is expected to conform to the 
pattern noted in Figure 4. 
The following simple effects are predicted. (1) The winning 
player will attribute more success to self as an actor (cell 00) 
than to the other as an observer (01). (2) The losing player will 
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attribute less success to self as an actor (10) than to the other 
as an observer (11). (3) The winning actor will attribute more 
success to self (00) than will the losing actor (10). (4) The 
losing observer (11) will attribute more success to the other than 
will a winning observer (01). Support of these predictions will 
provide a manipulation check. It will verify that winning the 
skill strategy game is perceived as a success and that losing is 
not. 
Ruble (1973) found the actor-observer divergence in success-
ful and unsuccessful outcomes, where actors attributed less per-
sonal (more situational) responsibility than observers did. His 
procedure, however, involved subjects responding to scenario 
material, and the ego-involvement of subjects was minimized. He 
does not report any check which determined if the subject's per-
ception of the successfulness in each scenario paralleled the 
experimenter's assumptions. The test described above will pro-
vide that check. 
Fitch (1970) postulated that self-concept may be related to 
attribution of causality by means 0£ two complimentary hypotheses. 
The self-consistency hypothesis suggests that persons with high 
self-esteem would attribute success to themselves, but failure to 
other causes, while persons with low self-esteem would attribute 
failure to their own personal undesirable attributes, but would 
attribute causality for success to other causes. The self-
enhancement hypothesis, on the other hand, simply posits that all 
individuals would seek to enhance their own self-concepts by 
claiming responsibility for success and disclaiming responsibility 
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for failure. Fitch (1970) supported both hypotheses. In the fail 
condition, the low self-esteem subjects were more likely to see 
the cause as internal than high self-esteem subjects. Thus, they 
reacted to failure in a manner consistent with their self-concept. 
In the success condition, however, both high and low self-concept 
subjects tended to attribute the cause to internal factors, thus 
enhancing their self-esteem. 
Fitch's procedure involved pretesting subjects for ~elf­
esteem, then selecting high and low self-esteem subjects from the 
pretest scores. This procedure may overaccentuate and obviate 
the differential impact of self-esteem; low self-esteem subjects 
probably were more difficult to locate than high self-esteem ones. 
One indicator of positive self-esteem is the subject's expressed 
likability for self. Previous experience with the current sub-
ject pool indicate~ that these individuals generally like them-
selves and have positive self-images. This experience lays the 
foundation for the assumption of positive self-concept as a 
mediating variable. Any lack of congruence of subject self-
esteem level with this assumption is treated as experimental 
error. 
If the subjects are ego-involved in the determination of 
outcomes, /that is, the outcome is salient and relevant for sub-
jects, unlike Ruble's (1973) study/, then we would predict an 
actor-observer divergence for both successful and unsuccessful 
outcome levels. But this attributional divergence should be 
reversed for successful outcomes. If subjects have positive 
self-images, than they should claim personal causality for sue-
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cess and disclaim this causality for failure. Thus we would pre-
dict an outcome by viewpoint interaction. The data pattern for 
personal causality should be as summarized in Figure 4 (page 23). 
The following simple effects hypotheses are advanced. (1) The win-
ning player will attribute more personal causality to self as an 
actor (00) than to the other as an observer (01). (2) The losing 
player will attribute greater causality to the other as an ob-
server (11) than to self as an actor (10). (3) The winning 
actor will attribute greater personal causality to self (00) than 
will the losing actor (10). (4) The losing actor will attribute 
more personal causality to the other than will a winning observer 
(01). This interaction of outcome with viewpoint for personal 
causality is termed, for the previous reasons, the perceived self-
concept support hypothesis or, more parsimoniously, the self-
enhancement hypothesis. 
If situational causality were the opposite end of the personal 
causality continuum (as in Ruble, 1973), then we would predict 
another outcome by viewpoint interaction for situational causality, 
reversing the pattern found in personal causality. However, the 
present author has unpublished data which indicates that personal 
causality and situational causality are not phenomenological op-
posites to naive subjects. When situational and personal causal-
ity represent two dependent variables (instead of a single bipolar 
variable as in Ruble, 1973), they are not always negatively cor-
related. Since this relationship is unclear, only one prediction 
about situational causality will be offered. Jones and Nisbett 
(1971) attribute the actor-observer divergence to different infer-
mation available to the actor and observer. From this line 0£ 
reasoning, we would predict that actors would attribute greater 
situational causality than observers (a viewpoint main e££ect). 
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Not only will each subject provide ratings 0£ personal and 
situational causality, but each will also provide stability rat-
ings on these dimensions. These two dimensions (the Weiner di-
mensions 0£ locus and stability) will yield a 2 x 2 matrix (i.e., 
Figure 3, page 20}, and will permit the evaluation 0£ the fol-
lowing hypotheses using the chi-square statistic. I£ subjects 
have positive self-concepts, and i£ they become personally in-
volved at the task at hand, we would expect the following hypo-
theses to be mediated through this self-esteem variable. (1) 
Winners will make more stable attributions than losers. Ruble 
(1973) found that success was attributed to stable £actors while 
failure was attributed to unstable £actors. (2) Winning actors 
will make stable attributions than losing actors. (3) Winning 
actors will make more stable internal attributions than unstable 
internal attributions (e.g., £or winners it is more their ability 
than their effort). (4) Winning actors will make more stable 
external attributions than unstable external attributions (e.g., 
success is due more to task easiness than to luck). (5) Losing 
actors will make more unstable external attributions than un-
stable internal attributions (e.g., their failure will be attri-
buted more to luck than to their own effort). 
The underlying assumption of positive self-esteem will be 
partially testable by examining the subject's attribution 0£ 
likability for self and the other. Since members of the dyads 
will be relatively unacquainted, we predict that more likability 
will be assigned to self than to the other (a viewpoint main ef-
fect.) If winning is perceived as being successful, and if suc-
cess is perceived as good (and, therefore, to be desired), then 
we would expect wtnners to attribute more likability to self 





Forty-eight students who were recruited from introductory 
psychology courses served as subjects. They were recruited by 
means of sign-up sheets circulated through their classes, arrl 
the sign-up sheets billed the experiment as a skill strategy 
game. Twenty-four subjects were males, and twenty-four were 
females. 
Experimental Design 
This study is best conceptualized as actually two experi-
ments using the same subjects. The first dealing with predictive 
attributions (predicting outcome and causality before the game), 
and the second investigating the same variables after the game 
was completed and the actual outcome had been announced. The 
same subjects providing data before and after the game. 
In the predictive attribution portion of the study, the 
following experimental design (independent variables) were em-
ployed: sex of subject (male or female) by opponent's sex (same 
or different) by predicted outcome (win or lose) by viewpoint 
(actor and observer). The first three factors were between sub-
ject factors, while the latter one represented a within subjects 
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or repeated measures factor. Equal numbers of males and females 
were recruited, and randomly assigned to the appropriate level of 
opponent's sex. However, because subjects predicted their own 
outcome, there were not equal numbers within the outcome levels, 
due to the unsurprizing fact that more subjects predicted a win-
ning than a losing outcome. Twenty-seven subjects predicted they 
would would win, while twenty-one said they expected to lose. 
In the postdictive portion of the study, the following ex-
perimental design was utilized: sex of subject (male or female) 
by opponent's sex (same or different} by actual outcome (win or 
lose) by viewpoint (actor and observer). Again, the first three 
factors were between subject factors, while the fourth was a with-
in subjects repeated measure. All factors, with the exception of 
subjects, were considered to be fixed factors. In this portion 
of· the study, there were six observations in every cell. 
The rationale for including sex of subject and opponent's 
sex as independent variables was to control these systematically. 
Subject's sex has been shown to influence many social psychologic-
al~processes and the author has found sex differences in predic-
tive attributions in previous work. If the opponent's sex were 
not controlled, in mixed sex dyads the attributions of likability 
and personality evaluations (i:e., the Semantic Differential rat-
ings) would likely be confounded by such processes as interperson-
al attraction and suspicion about motivations. 
Dependent Variables 
The same dependent variables were utilized in both the pre-
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dictive and postdictive segments of the study. Each subject pro-
vided data both for himself and his view of the other person both 
before and after the skill strategy game on a number of semantic 
differential scales (see Appendix A for a complete listing of the 
dependent variables.) The subject rated the success of the pre-
dieted and actual outcomes on a nine point very unsuccessful-
very successful dimension, personal causality and situational 
causality each on a nine point continuum, stability of internal 
and external causes on a nine point continuum, and likability on a 
nine point continuum varying from very little to very much from 
both the actor and observer perspectives. The subjects also 
rated both self and other on a modified semantic differential, in 
addition to expressing his confidence in his predictions about 
the outcome. 
Experimental Procedure 
When the subjects reported to the experimental laboratory 
wainting room, each was given an extra-credit/nondisclosure slip 
to complete along with an acquaintance scale. If subjects were, 
in fact, acquainted they were assigned to a current scenario 
study. 
The experimenter then escorted the subjects to the Prison-
ers' Dilemma Game (PDG) room, and seated subjects at the separate 
PDG units. The experimenter then read the following statement to 
the subjects as an introduction to the study. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how we 
determine the cause of an event both before it oc-
curs (that is, how we predict events and outcomes), 
and how we determine what the cause of the event is 
after it has occurred. The particular event we are 
concerned about is the event of winning or losing. 
We are also interested in looking at how we see our-
selves and our opponents both before and after the 
winning or losing experience. So in order to examine 
these relationships, we will have you play a skill 
strategy game. We have found that the winner of this 
game is usually more skillful, and uses better strategy 
than the loser. To make the winning more salient, 
we will give the winner an additional extra credit 
point for winning. 
The order of things during this time period is as fol-
lows: We will introduce you to the skill strategy 
game. The object of the game is to gain more points 
than your opponent. After we have introduced you to 
the game, we will play 5 practice trials. We will 
then ask you to make some predictions and ratings 
about the game, about yourself, and abo~t your op-
ponent. After you have completed these ~uestions, 
we will play 15·trial game. There will be a defin-
ite winner and a definite loser, and we will play 
off ties if needed. After the game is over, and the 
outcome is announced, we will ask you to do more 
ratings on the game, on yourself, and on the other 
person. 
After the experimenter had read the general introduction to 
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the study, the subjects read written instructions provided by the 
experimenter explaining the PDG scoring schema. The experimenter 
then introduced the subjects to the skill strategy game and an-
swered all questions that the subjects had. 
A five trial miniature skill strategy game was played to 
familiarize the subjects with the game. This provided them with 
some knowledge about their opponent's skill, ability, and strategy 
to aid in their predictions. Subjects them completed the pregame 
portion of the data collection booklet (see Appendix B.) This 
I 
rating activity was followed by the 15 trial skill strategy game, 
which determined the actual outcome for each subject. 
The experimenter announced the score after each trial and 
called out the trial number. After 15 trials the experimenter 
announced the winner and loser, instructing the winner and loser 
to write their appropriate outcomes on each page of the postgame 
portion of the data collection booklet in the space provided. 
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This was intended to make the winning or losing even more salient 
to the subjects. The subjects then completed the postgame portion 
of the data booklets. Subjects were then thoroughly debriefed and 
informed of the pilot data findings. After the data was analyzed, 
the experimenter composed a memorandum outlining the major results 




The data analyses were primarily accomplished by ANOVA pro-
cedures and simple effects tests (Kirk, 1968) unless explicitly 
stated otherwise. The general discussion will follow the follow-
ing format. For each dependent variable, the stated hypotheses 
will be discussed; first from the predictive perspective, and then 
from the postdictive perspective. After the stated hypotheses are 
discussed, significant, but unhypothesized, findings will be dis-
cussed. These univariate statistical procedures will be followed 
by a multivariate analysis. The factor analysis will help deter-
mine the patterning of attributions made by the subjects. 
Success 
To determine if winning was perceived as successful and los-
ing as unsuccessful, subjects provided ratings of success on both 
self and other (i.e., from both the actor and observer perspec-
tives) on predicted and actual outcomes. This is construed as a 
manipulation check. An outcome x viewpoint interaction was hypo-
thesized, where winning actors and losing observers attributed 
high success and losing actors and winning observers attributed 
low success. The predicted data pattern was shown in Figure 4 






MEANS FOR SUCCESS FOR OUTCOME X VIEWPOINT INTERACTION FOR 
BOTH PREDICTIVE AND POSTDICTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Predictions Postdictions 
Viewpoint Viewpoint 
Actor(self') Observer(other) Actor(self') Observer(other) 
6.26 5.04 7.29 4.42 
n=27 n=27 n=24 n=24 
4.81 6.10 3.21 7.42 




for this interaction for both predictions and postdictions. 
Predictions 
For predictions, a significant outcome by viewpoint interac-
tion was noted, ~(1,38) = 14.S8, p<.0008. A simple effects 
breakdown revealed that, as predicted, (1) those anticipating a 
win attributed more success as an actor to self than as an ob-
server to the other, E(l,38) = 7.92, p<.Ol; (2) those antici-
pating a loss attributed less success as an actor to self than 
as an observer to the other, ~(1,38) = 6.S2, p"<:.OS; (3) those 
expecting to win attributed more success to self than did those 
expecting to lose, E(l,78) ~ 13.78, p<.001; and (4) those ob-
servers who expected the other to lose were more likely to at-
tribute less success than observers who expected the other to 
win, F{l,78) = 7.34, p<.Ol. These findings support the asser-
tion that for predictive attributions winning the skill strategy 
game is perceived as successful, while losing is not. 
Postdictions 
For postdictions, a significant outcome x viewpoint interac-
tion occurred, E{l,40) = 70.90, p<.0001. These means are also 
presented in Table I. The simple effects tests also show support 
for the predictions which were supported by the above comparisons. 
(1) The winning player attributed more success as an actor to 
self than as an observer to the other, E(l,40) = 23.36, p<.OOOl; 
(2) the losing player attributed less success as an actor to self 
than as an observer to the other, E(l,40) = SO.SO, p <.0001; (3) 
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the winning player attributed more success as an actor than did 
the losing actors, F(l,80) = 59.58, p<.OOOl; and (4) the losing 
observer attributed more success than did the winning observer, 
F(l,80) = 32.16, p<.OOOl. 
These postdictive attributions were patterned as predicted, 
and were statistically more reliable than those for predictive 
attributions, but show remarkable parallels to the predicted 
outcomes. Thus, it can be concluded that the outcome manipula-
tion produced the intended effect. It is important to show that 
winning is a success, because the attribution research that deals 





For both predictive and postdictive personal causality attri-
butions, an outcome x viewpoint interaction on personal causality 
ratings was predicted, as indicated in Figure 4 (page 23). This 
self-enhancement hypothesis states that winning actors and losing 
observers would attribute more personal causality than winning 
observers or losing actors. The means for personal causality for 
both predictive and postdictive cases are presented in Table II. 
For predictive attributions a marginal trend was noted, 
F{l,38) = 3.68, pC::.06. Even though the statistical interac~ion 
was only marginally significant in the expected direction, simple 
effects tests were computed to permit an explicit evaluation of 
the stated hypotheses. Only one of the four hypotheses was sup-
TABLE II 
MEANS FOR PERSONAL CAUSALITY FOR OUTCOME X VIEWPOINT INTERACTION 
FOR BOTH PREDICTIVE AND POSTDICTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Predictions Postdictions 
Viewpoint Viewpoint 
Outcome Actor{self) Observer(other) Actor(self) Observer{other) 
5.52 4.89 4.79 4.25 
Win n=27 n=27 n=24 n=24 
4.95 5.14 5.50 5.50 




ported. Winning actors attributed more personal causality than 
winning observers, E(l,38) = 4.96, p<.OS. Thus, winning actors 
did not attribute more personal causality than losing actors, nor 
did losing observers attribute more personal causality than losing 
actors or winning observers. However, the means occurred in the 
predicted direction. 
Table II also presents the personal causality means for the 
poetdictive outcome x viewpoint interaction. The hypoth~sized 
interaction did not occur, F(l,40) = .98, ns. Simple effects 
tests also revealed that these means were not significantly dif-
ferent, and the pattern of means did not conform to that predicted 
nor those found in the predictive attribution data. Two explan-
ations for the failure to support the self-enhancement hypothesis 
with the postdictive data are suggested. (1) Situational effects 
may have been so strong that personal causality effects were ob-
literated. (2) Since predictive attributions and postdictive 
attributions were repeated measures on the same subjects, carry-
over effects can not be ruled out. No other effects were noted in 
the postdictive data. 
Unhypothesized Findings 
A sex x opponent's sex x outcome interaction occurred in the 
predictive data, E(l,38) = 6.09, pC::,017. Table III presents the 
means. This interaction was broken apart by computing simple in-
teraction effects (opponent's sex x outcome) at each level of 
subject's sex. Opponent's sex did not interact with outcome for 
male subjects, f(l,40) = 1.25, ns; simple simple effects tests 
TABLE III 
MEANS FOR SEX X OPPONENT'S SEX X OUTCOME INTERACTION FOR 




Opponent's Sex Win Lose Win 
Same 
5.05 5.50 5.80 
n=20 n=4 n=lO 
Different 
6.00 4.75 3.25 









supported this finding that males did not allocate personal causal-
ity different when playing males or females, nor when they pre-
dieted themselves to win or lose. Males were indiscriminant in 
their attribution of personal causality. But for females, the 
opponent's sex x outcome interaction was significant, f(l,40) = 
7.97, p<.Ol. Simple simple effects tests demonstrated (1) that 
females who expected to win tended to attribute more personal 
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causality (to self and other combined) when playing other females 
than when playing males, f(l,40} = 3.13, p<.os; (2) females who 
predicted themselves to lose attributed less personal causality 
(to self and other) when they played females than when they played 
males, f(l,40) = 4.66, p<.os; and (3) females who predicted 
themselves to\liin when playing males attributed less personal 
causality than females who predicted themselves to lose when 
playing males, F(l,40) = 4.98, p<.os. Hence, females attributed 
personal causality when they expect to win or when they play 
males, but not both. When females play females and expect to 
lose, each is viewed as somewhat cooperative (M = 4.14); but 
when females play males and expect to win, they view themselves 
and their opponents as less cooperative (more competitive, ~ = 
2.50). When females who expect to win interacted with males, 
the females defined the situation as volatile. Further arguments 
paralleling this interpretation of their ratings are presented 
later in the factor analytic discussion. 
Predicted Outcome -- Sex-related Effects 
Only two sex-related effects were noted relative to the 
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subjects' predicted outcomes. More males predicted themselves to 
win (10) than to lose (2) when their opponents were males, ,:}(1) 
= 5.33, p4.05; and more males (overall) predicted th~mselves to 
win (18) than to lose (6), IJ_ 2 (1) = 6.00, p~.02. These trends 
were not noted for females, nor for males and females combined. 
Situational Causality 
The Actor-Observer Divergence 
Because situational causality is not the phenomenological 
opposite (as Ruble'~ bipolar measurement schema suggests) of per-
sonal causality, only on~ prediction was generated: actors could 
be expected to attribute greater situational causality than ob-
servers (i.e.~ a viewpoint main effect). (The correlation between 
situational causality and personal causality across all independ-
ent variables was r = .36 for predictive attributions; the same 
correlation for postdictive attributions was r = .16. Neither 
of these are the high negative correlation expected if situational 
and personal causality were phenomenological opposites, as sug-
gested in Ruble's 1973 procedures.) 
A marginal trend confirming the actor-observer divergence was 
observed in the predictive attribution data. Actors attributed 
greater situational causality (~ = 7.083) than observers did {M 
6.625), F(l,38) = 3.59, p~.06. Thus, Jones and Nisbett's (19?1) 
attributional divergence hypothesis received some support in 
predictive situations. However, in the postdictive attributions, 
this hypothesis was not supported, F(l,40) = .02, ns. The actors 
(~ = 7.15) attributed the same situational causality as observers 
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(M = 7.10). The failure to reverse the attributional pattern 
described in Figure 4 (page 23) supports, again, the previous 
contention that situational causality is not the observe of per-
sonal causality, unless so constrained by the measurement system. 
In predictive circumstances (and postdictive scenario circum-
stances) it seems that the actor is able to envision and interpret 
anticipated situational stimulation, while the observer takes a 
more panoramic view, incorporating the behaving actor (but not 
his perceptions) into the phenomenal field. In postdictive in 
situ circumstances, however, where both the actor and the obser-
ver directly experience the situation (that is, the observer is 
a Earticipating observer) the view one takes does not influence 
the attribution of situational causality. The observer under 
these circumstances appears to anticipate the actor's experience 
of the situation. It may also be interpreted as an inability of 
subjects to separate the two views, or as an heightened salience 
of the immediate situation .. , Having experienced the situational 
stimuli, the observer empathizes with the actor and makes attri-
butions from that viewpoint. 
If this logic is sound, then one would expect situational 
causality ·to be greater in postdictive, actually experience situ-
ations than in predictive or projective circumstances. The grand 
means for the predictive data and the postdictive situational 
causality data were subjected to a significance test. The nature 
of this test requires comment. Some subjects had their predicted 
outcomes confirmed, while others did not. Since all subjects did 
not receive the same experience during the experimental procedures, 
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a correlated t would have been difficult to calculate or inter-
pret. Thus, an independent! was calculated; the zero-covariance 
assumption seems reasonable and also provides a conservative test 
if the covariance is actually positive. The predictive situation 
was attributed less situational causality (M::: 6.85, SD = l.90) 
than the postdictive rating situation (~::: 7.13, SD = 1.74), !(190) 
= 1.03, p<.30. While the difference did occur in the anticipated 
direction, the null hypothesis can not be rejected. Hence, this 
post hoc hypothesis will be held in abeyance, pending a direct, 
planned test. 
Attributed Stability of Cause 
Each subject rated both personal and situational factors on a 
very unstable-very stable dimension scaled from l (very unstable) 
to 9 (very stable). Thus each subject made two attributions: 
either a stable or unstable internal (personal) attribution and a 
stable or unstable external (situational) attribution. This pro-
cedure does not permit many comparisons between internal and ex-
ternal attributions, but does emphasize contrasts between per-
ceived stability. (Let it also be recognized that the winner 
versus loser comparison~ in the predictive data are confounded 
with the sheer frequency of predicted winners and losers. This 
is not a problem for the postdictive data, since outcome was 
zero-sum, with equal numbers of winners and losersr) 
In the following analysis, if the subject chose the theo-
retical midpoint of 5 on the stability scale, that observation 
was discarded since it denoted neither or both unstability and 
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stability. If the rating was less than S, it was considered un-
stable, and ratings greater than 5 were taken as indicating that 
the subject perceived that cause as· being stable. 
Five predictions were made. From Ruble's (1973) data, it was 
hypothesized that winners would make more stable attributions than 
losers. In the predictive data, this was the observed trend. Win-
ners did make more stable attributions (70) than losers (44), 
~2 (1) = 5.93, pL.025; whereas in postdiction, winners made the 
same number of stable attributions (59) as losers (63), ~2(1) = 
.13, ns. 
The second hypothesis, which is a subset of the first one, 
stated that winning actors would make more stable attributions 
than losing actors. This tendency was confirmed in the predictive 
data. Winning·actors tended to make more stable attributions (40) 
than losing actors (25), ~ 2(1) = 3.46, p.(..07. However, in the 
postdictive portion this was not observed. Winning actors made 
the same number of stable attributions (30) as losing actors (31), 
~2(1) = .02, ns. It was also hypothesized that winning actors 
could be expected to make more stable internal attributions than 
unstable internal attributions. Predicted winning actors made 
more stab!~ internal attributions (23) than unstable internal 
attributions (2),~ 2 (1) = 17.64, p'.001. Actual winning actors 
also made more stable internal attributions (16) than unstable 
internal attributions (5),~2 (1) = 5.76, p~.025. Thus, £or 
both predictive and postdictive cases, winners attributed sue-
cess to self more because of their ability than their effort. 
This suggests a feeling that they just could not help but win. 
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It was also predicted that winning actors would make more 
stable external attributions than unstable external attributions. 
For both cases this was true. Winning (or those who predicted 
themselves to win) actors did make more stable external attribu-
tions (17 and 14 ) than unstable external attributions 
pre post 
( 7 and 3 ) , N 2 (1) = 4.17, P' .05 and ff 2 (1) = 7.12, pre post .,_ pre /V post 
p~ .01. Winners thus appear more willing to attribute their sue-
cess to task easiness than to luck. This may be interpreted as 
an avoidance of the threatening implications of a belief in a 
capricious universe or as a need to believe in stability or 
consistency (Lerner, 1965). 
If Fitch's (1970) self-consistency hypothesis is correct, 
we might expect losing actors (who are presumed to hold positive 
self-imagesJ to attribut~ their failure to the unstable external 
factor of luck rather than to the unstable internal factor of 
effort. However, this happened neither in predictions nor in 
postdictions. Perhaps a positive self-image is not associated 
with the experience nor the anticipation of losing. 
There was a pervasive tendency for both winners and losers, 
for both actors and observers to make stable internal and stable 
external attributions (116 and 132 ) rather than unstable 
pre post 
personal (internal) and unstable external attributions (29 
µre 
and 30 ) , !f- 2 (1) = 52.20, p4! .001, and A' 2 (1) = 64.20, 
post pre /""' post 
p,£ .001. This pervasive tendency to attribute stability to one-
self and one's opponent in terms of personal and situational 
causality can be taken as evidence supporting Fitch's (1970) self-
enhancement hypothesis and the underlying positive self-esteem 
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assumption. In seven of nine experimental groups, Fitch's (1970) 
subjects attributed more causality to the stable internal factor 
of ability than to effort (the internal unstable factor), a 
striking parallel with the present data. This suggests that in 
W~stern culture, superior performance is more likely to be taken 
as evidence of high ability than of tremendous effort. On the 
other hand, the tendency to fail for lack of ability receives 
fewer societal sanctions than for failure due to a lack of effort. 
It seems that high ability is more commendable than high effort, 
but that low ability is less reprehensible than low effort. 
Stability of Personal Factors 
The stability ratings were also subjected to ANOVA. In the 
predictive data for stability of personal causality, a significant 
viewpoint main effect was noted. More stability was attributed to 
personal causality as an actor (M =6.85) than as an observer (~ -
5.90), f{l,38) = 9.08, p<:.025. It indicates that persons view 
their own personal dispositions as more stable causal agents than 
other's dispositions. However, this interpretation is subject to 
an observed sex x viewpoint interaction, F(l,38) = 10.22, pC::::.003. 
Table IV presents these means. 
Simple effects tests revealed (1) that male subjects attribu-
ted more stability to self as a causal agent than females did, 
F(l,78) = 5.41, p<::.05, and (2) that male subjects attributed more 
stability to self than to other as a causal agent, F{l,38) = 
19.28, p<.001. Stated in other terms, male actors attributed 
more personal stability than did either female actors and obser-
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vers or male observers. This is somewhat reminiscent of the com-
manly held stereotype which both sexes hold about the male per-
sonality being more stable than its female counterpart. 
TABLE IV 
MEANS FOR SEX X VIEWPOINT INTERACTION FOR 
STABILITY OF PERSONAL CAUSATION 
Viewpoint 
Sex Actor( self) Observer( other) 
Male 7.13 5.70 
;Female 6.04 6.08 
However, these findings were not replicated in the postdict-
ive data. The only statistically significant observation was 
that males attributed more personal causal stability (~ = 6.90) 
than did females (M = 5.98), F(l,40) = 5.38, p-<.025. One im-
plication of this difference is that males may be less situation-
oriented than females. Timpe, Merrifield, and Helm (1975) sup: 
port this interpretation in a study which found attributional 
differences between males and females. However, Luginbuhl, ~ ~· 
(1975) and Regan, et~· (1974) both report no attributional 
differences between males and females. In fact, Jones and 
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Nisbett (1971) do not even describe their subject pool relative 
to sex. These sex differences appear to occur with great regu-
larity in this geographical region, but are not even reported 
elsewheret They deserve an investigation of their own. 
Stability of Situational Factors 
When situational stability was analyzed, only one significant 
F test was observed, and that was in the predictive or anticipa-
tory data. A significant outcome x viewpoint interaction was 
observed, ~(1,38) ~ 5.22, p<.03. These means are presented in 
Table V. 
TABLE V 
MEANS FOR OUTCOME X VIEWPOINT INTERACTION FOR 
ATTRIBUTED SITUATIONAL STABILITY 
Viewpoint 
Outcome Actor (self) Observer( other) 
Win 5.70 5.29 
Lose 5.71 6.40 
However, simple effects tests failed to isolate any signi-
ficant differences. Though actors attribute similar situational 
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stability regardless of outcome, the outcome seems to have had an 
effect upon observer-attributed situational stability. This 
finding is interesting in the light of the Ruble (1973) finding 
that actors attributed more situational causality irrespective of 
outcome and the association of stability success and instability 
with failure. Neither of these findings have been replicated 
here. The operation of the underlying positive self-concept seems 
to have reversed the actor-observer divergence for success in 
this case, and contributed to the attribution of stability in-
spite of outcome. 
Likability 
Positive Self-Esteem Assumption 
It was hypothesized that a viewpoint main effect should oc-
cur, where more likability is attributed to self than to other. 
As predicted this effected was noted in the predictive data. Ac-
tors attributed more likability (~ = 7.83) than observers (~ = 
6.17), f(l,38). = 19.68, p <:.0002. The viewpoint main effect was 
again observed in the postdictive data. Actors attributed more 
likability (~ = 7.29) than observers (M = 6.63), F(l,40) = 4.99, 
pC:.03. No other significant effects were noted in either the 
predictive or postdictive data in the attribution of likability. 
These findings lend credence to out undeilying assumption of 
positive self-esteem operating as a mediational variable. It 
would be expected that when members of an unacquainted dyad 
assessed their liking for self and other, more liking for self 
would be attributed or expressed than for the unknown other. 
This should be especially true for subjects who hold positive 




Each subject rated how confident he was in his own predicted 
outcome and in his prediction about the opponent's outcome. A 
significant outcome main effect was observed. Those who.predicted 
themselves to win attributed more confidence in that prediction 
(M = 5.90) than those who predicted their own loss, (M = 4.93), 
F(l,40) = 5.06, p<.03. However, when these confidence ratings 
were analyzed relative to actual outcome, a su.rprizing reversal 
occurred. Those who actually won the game attributed less con-
fidence to their predictions (t!. = 5.10) than the actual losers 
had (M = 5.85), F(l,40) = 2.83, p-C:::.10. Neither of these outcome 
main effects were subject to higher order interactions. 
Semantic Differential Ratings 
Little systematic interpretable variance was found in the 
predictive or anticipatory data which shows any influence of pre-
dicted outcomes on personality evaluations. Several sex x oppon-
ent1 s sex x viewpoint interactions (e.g., on accommodation, affect, 
evaluation, motivation, and frustration ratings) were observed in 
the predictive attributions. But because these relate more to 
the person perception process of sex role stereotypes than to 
correlates of success and £allure, they are not discussed here. 
(Factor clusterings among these concepts are described below.) 
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Two significant outcome x viewpoint interacti6ns were noted 
for the dependent variables of 1taggressive;" F(l,40) = 11.64, 
p<:.0002, and "cooperative, 1r f.(1,40) = 14.58, pC:::.001, in the post-
game data. These means are presented in Table VI. 
Simple effects tests were used to break down these interac-
tions. Winning actors attributed more aggressiveness than losing 
actors, F(l,80) = 6.12, p <.OS, while losing observers attributed 
more aggressiveness than losing actors, f.(1,40) = 9.09, p <.Ol. 
Thus, there was a trend for aggressiveness to be associated with 
successful outcomes, as would be expected in the PDG paradigm. 
Winning actors attributed less cooperativeness (more com-
petitiveness) than losing actors, F(l,80) = 16.33, p~.001, but 
winning actors also attributed less cooperativeness than winning 
observers, f.(1,40) = 4.10, p<.05. Losing actors attributed more 
cooperativeness than losing observers, f.(1,40) = 11.39, p<.002. 
Hence, aggressiveness was attributed to winners and cooperative-
ness to losers in this PDG interaction. This pattern is as ex-
pected, given the competitive instruction set under which the 
subjects participated. 
Factor Structure of Predictive Attributions 
Since subjects have been shown to make several different 
types of attributions (i.e., confidence, success, causality, 
liking, personality evaluations, etc.) the interesting question 
arises as to interrelationships among these perceptions. The 
non-mathematically-dependent dependent variables were subjected 





?OSTDICTIVE MEANS FOR OUTCOME X VIEWPOINT INTERACTION FOR 
AGGRESSIVENESS AND COOPERATION 
Aggressiveness Cooperation 
Viewpoint Viewpoint 
Actor(sel£) Observer(other) Actor(sel£) Observer(other) 
5.42 4.92 2.08 2.83 





varimax rotation toward simple structure. The independent vari-
ables were also entered as marker variables. The seven factors 
extracted from the correlation matrix accounted for 65.27 percent 
of the total variance. Salient loadings were considered to have 
a value off .401 or greater. Table VII presents the varimax 
structure of predictive attributions. 
Factor 1 -- Bravado 
This factor loaded on the marker variable of view and on 
likability, inhibition, and potency. Before the skill strategy 
game, pla~ers viewed their opponents as being more inhibited, 
less potent and less likable than themselves. Conversely, they 
expressed positive liking for themselves, and saw themselves as 
less inhibited and more potent and powerful in this interaction 
than their opponents. However, this attributed potency was in-
dependent of either predicted outcome or confidence in that 
prediction. Thus, the term 1rbravadd 1 seems appropriate to des-
scribe this pretended courage or defiant confidence, even when 
there was really little or none. Something akin to bravado is 
also implicated by the post-game reversal of confidence ratings, 
reported on p. 51. 
·Factor 2 -- Self-Reliance 
Three variables loaded on this factor with a slight tendency 
for a fourth. Those who expressed greater confidence in their 
predictions also expected greater success, attributed greater 
personal causality, and tended to attribute greater situational 
TABLE VII 
ROTATED FACTOR STRUCTURE OF PREDICTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Variable Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sex of Subject* -.05 - .05 .16 .04 .83 -.17 -.02 
Opponent's Sex* .18 .06 .10 -.69 .13 - .07 - .07 
Outcome* .01 -.24 -.16 -.22 .71 ~23 -.07 
View* .51 -.13 - .05 -.15 -.14 -.26 -.19 
Confidence -.07 .76 .15 -.09 -.18 -.13 .07 
Success -.03 .60 .26 .04 -.01 .11 -.04 
Personal Causality -.01 .72 -.27 -.05 .02 .17 -.21 
Stability of Personal Causality -.21 - .04 .05 .10 -.08 .81 -.05 
Situational Causality .10 .36 .16 -.40 .03 .62 .13 
Stability of Situational Causality .01 .29 -.26 -.59 .oo .31 .14 
Likability -.57 .28 -.10 .00 -.10 .lS .54 
Activity ·-.06 .05 .79 .10 -.02 -.10 .04 
Accommodativeness .21 .13 .12 .67 .08 .01 .24 
Affect -.21 -.07 .10 .04 - .01 -.01 .85 
Aggressiveness -.11 .20 .72 .oo .04 .28 .08 
Cooperativeness .28 .24 - .46 .12 .52 -.14 .OS 
Evaluation .10 -.11 .03 .14 - .03 .00 .88 
Inhibition .67 .05 -.24 -.10 .15 -.OS -.04 
Potency -.67 .01 .00 - .45 .07 -.10 -.10 
% of Extracted Variance 14.35 15.92 14.32 14.46 12.68 12.06 16.21 
*Marker variables were coded such that high reflects female, opposite sex opponent, lose, 




stability. Although outcome did not reach the salience criterion 
of I .401 , it loaded in such a way as to indicate that winning 
was the pcedicted outcome (-.24). This factor describes those 
individuals who through self-reliance and self-assuredness were 
confident in their upcoming success· and claimed personal causal-
ity for the win. 
Factor 3 -- Aggressive Determination 
The three components of this layman style aggressiveness 
(i.e., super salesmanship) factor were high activity, high ag-
gressiveness, and low cooperativeness (high competitiveness.) 
This pattern would seem to be the behavioral style associated 
with the attitude of self-reliance of Factor 2. However, the 
fact that aggressiveness and self-reliance are separate factors 
indicated that the "I can do it" attitude is relatively independ-
ent of the behavioral action, 1tI am doing it. 11 
Factor 4 -- Heterosexual Alertness 
When subjects entered the competitive skill strategy inter-
action with an opponent of the opposite sex, an explosive and 
volatile-situation was defined. Subjects perceived the situation 
as stable and attributed situational causality, with both self 
and other being seen as exploitative and potent. In mixed sex 
dyads, the situation seems to demand particular alertness and 
attention. Similarity between self and one's opponent can not 
be assumed, and when assumed personal stability is suspect, the 
situation takes on added significance. Conversely, in a same 
sex dyad, the situation as a causal agent is de-emphasized, and 
the situation is defined as unstable and probably unimportant; 
each player is seen as accommodative and impotent. 
Factor 5 -- Sex Role Stereotype 
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When the subject was female, there was a tendency to predict 
failure for oneself and to see both self and other as cooperative. 
However, males expected to win more often and they saw themselves 
and others as more competitive. This tendency for males to be 
seen as success oriented, and consequently, more competitive, and 
for females to be viewed as unsuccessful and cooperative parallels 
the common stereotype of masculine individualism and feminine sub-
mission. This relation between failure and attributed cooperative-
ness is expected under the competitive instruction set used. 
Factor 6 -- The Undefined 
Periodically in factor analytic work, factors appear for 
which no reasonable explanation exists. This is one of those 
factors. Though it accounts for 12.06 percept of the extracted 
variance it precludes reasonable interpretation. Subjects tended 
to attri~ute personal causal stability and situational causality 
together. But this tendency is independent of attributed person-
ality traits, except for aggressiveness. There was also a slight 
trend for this pattern to appear in predicted failure self-view 
situations. But the co-occurance of perceived aggressiveness 
with a prediction of failure for self was unexpected, and remains 
yet unexplained. 
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Factor 7 -- Liking 
Three variables had salient loadings and characterize the 
predominant influence on this factor. It was characterized by 
high evaluation, high affect, and moderate liking. When subjects 
expressed liking, they also consistently provided ratings of high 
evaluation and high affect. However, liking was not dependent 
upon sex of subject, upon the opponent's sex, upon predicted out-
come, not upon personality evaluations. 
Byrne (1971) has summarized research which systematically 
links interpersonal attraction with similarity on a number of 
dimensions. This relationship between attraction (of which lik-
ability is but one component) and similarity affords an explana-
tion of this finding that liking is unrelated to sex, to outcome, 
and particularly, to personality attributions. Liking is unrelated 
to personality evaluations (at least layman personality impres-
sions) for the following reason. So long as abnormality is not 
implicated, each individual should be attracted to self (perfect 
similarity) and to others who are viewed as being similar to 
oneself. But because of the heterogeneous population and random 
assignment of individuals to dyads, matches pairs (in terms of 
similar personalities) did not systematically occur. The diver-
gent similarities among dyads should leave attraction, evaluation, 
and liking relatively free of systematic personality influences. 
Each dyad was similar or dissimilar on different dimensions, and 
averaging across these dyads removes the similarity influence. 
Thus attraction, here, remains independent of the influence of 
systematic personality similarities. 
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Factor Structure of Postdictive Attributions 
As in the predictive attributions, the postdictive attribu-
tions were factor analyzed by a principle components procedure 
and rotated to the varimax criterion: The same variables which 
were entered in the predictive attributions were also entered in 
this analysis. Such an approach enables a judgment concerning 
the pervasiveness of basic attribution processes, permits an 
investigation into the replicability of these processes, and al-
lows a predictive-postdictive comparison. 
Six factors were extractef from the correlation matrix, and 
these factors accounted for 60.60 percent of the total variance. 
Table VIII presents the rotated factor matrix for the postdictive 
data. 
Factor 1 -- Elements of Success 
Five variables contributed to and defined this factor. In a 
postgame situation, high success ratings are accompanied by 
attributed activity, high aggressiveness, competitiveness, and 
potency. Coversely, in low success situations, a low level of 
activity couples with cooperation is viewed as being associated 
with low aggressiveness and low potency. There was also a 
slight tendency for both outcome and confidence to contribute 
to this patterning. High success tends to be associated with the 
actual outcome of winning and with a moderate amount of confid-
ence in predictions. This factor seems to be a merger of the 
predictive factors of self-reliance (factor 2) and aggressive 
determination (factor 3). Actual success is a function of both 
T.ABLE VIII 
ROTATED FACTOR STRUCTURE OF POSTDICTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
variable Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor 
Name 1 2 3 4 s 6 
Sex of Subject* .02 - .07 .04 .08 .88 .08 
Opponent's Sex* -.19 .00 -.62 .. 13 .14 .. 18 
Outcome* .21 .18 -.19 .31 .02 -.67 
View* -.12 .04 -.03 .S4 -.10 .03 
Confidence -.3S -.07 .10 -.15 - .09 -.72 
Success -.58 -.19 .2S .25 .08 -.06 
Personal Causality -.01 .08 -.32 -.30 .37 -.41 
Stability of Personal Causality -.lS - .40 -.Sl -.08 -.33 -.34 
Situational Causality .07 .04 -.69 .OS -.05 -.09 
Stability of Situational Causality .07 ,05 -.4S - . 27 -.13 -.30 
Likability -.07 -.52 -.03 -.S3 -.18 -.27 
Activity -.61 .10 .07 -.26 .14 -.14 
Accommodativeness .21 -.60 .37 .18 .24 -.07 
Affect -.09 -.91 -.03 -.02 -.02 .12 
Aggressiveness -.77· -.17 -.21 .09 -.19 .00 
Cooperativenss .66 .OS .07 -.11 .41 -.26 
Evaluation -.06 -.93 -.03 .01 .02 .08 
Inhibition - .12 -.10 .02 .70 .13 -.08 
Potency -.S5 .29 ..;. .32 -.18 .13 -.11 
% of Extracted Variance 20.48 23.45 lS.99 13.82 12.40 13.86 
*Marker variables were coded such that high reflects female, opposite sex opponent, loss, 
and other, respectively. 
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ability or "can" and effort or "try" (Heider, 1958); actual suc-
cess depends on having ability plus effort. 
Factor 2 -- Interpersonal Esteem 
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This factor is a replication and extension of the predictive 
liking or evaluation factor (factor 7). High evaluation, high 
affect, and high kikability are associated with moderately high 
attributions of accommodation and moderate attributions 0£ stab-
ility concerning personal dispositions as causal factors. Persons 
who were considered somewhat accommodative after the interaction 
were also seen as a stable and predictable cause. Their consist-
ency and stability were rewarded by positive evaluation; high 
esteem is accorded those (both self and others) seen as stable, 
predictable, and consistent. 
Factor 3 -- Heterosexual Alertness Revisited 
This factor is essentially a replication of a pre-game fac-
tor (factor 4), with a notable exception. This exception is the 
addition of attributed stability of personal causality. Even 
after the game is played and the outcome announced, mixed sex 
dyads define the situation as volatile. The situation is attri-
buted causal potency, and in addition, it (along with personal 
dispositions) is seen as stable. Again, in these mixed sex dyads, 
exploitativeness and potency ate attributed as salient personal 
dispositions. In opposite sex situations, post-game ratings re-
vealed a tendency to supplement situational causality with person-
al causality. 
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Factor 4 -- Sore Loser Syndrome 
In the attraction literature, one of the many noted anteced-
ents of attraction is competence. When all other things are equal 
persons like competent persons more than incompetent ones. How-
ever, this "sore loserir factor sheds additional light (and quali-
. fications) on this proposition. When a loser makes attributions 
about the winner, the winner is seen as possessing less likability 
and more inhibitions than self and is viewed as slightly· more in-
active. These are not usually considered as socially desirable 
qualities. But when a winner views himself, he expresses liking 
for himself and thinks of himself as uninhibited. Under the 
extra credit for winning provision, losers could view their loss 
as failure and retaliate or avenge this outcome by scapegoating. 
They responded negatively to their victors. This interpretation 
is reasonable, since the research was conducted in a segment of 
the semester in which. "An students had already earned their grades, 
but 11"811 and 11·c1r students were presumable scrapping for every ad-
ditional point possible. With the addition of the outcome load-
ing and the deletion of the potency loading, there is a good 
parallel between this sore loser factor and "bravado" (predictive 
factor 1). 
Factor 5 -- Sex Role Stereotype Confirmed 
Female subjects tended to attribute personal causality to 
both self and other, yet viewed these personal dispositions as 
unstable and changeable. They also saw themselves and others as 
cooperative. This pa~allels the sex role stereotype of the 
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fifth predictive factor. Yet, there are deviations. Prior to 
the game, females were more likely to expect failure and loss, but 
after the game, outcome and succes~ were no longer pertinent. The 
sex role stereotype of feminine submission and cooperation was 
confirmed, regardless of outcome, while males were more likely to 
express expectations of competitiveness. 
Factor 6 -- Apologetic Winner Complex 
Four variables define this factor. Those who won the skill 
strategy game were those who originally expressed less confidence 
in their predictions. They avoided attributing personal causality 
(to self and other), and tended to view personal dispositions as 
unstable. Winners did not expect to win, and when they did, they 
still viewed the outcome as a function of unstable forces. This 
instability of personal dispositions was associated with expressed 
disliking. Thus winners effaced self and other after winning. 
They seemed glad, however, to accept the extra credit for winning, 
but declined any determination of blame for the other's outcome. 
Summary of the Factor Analyses 
Of the thirteen factors extracted (i.e., seven in predictive 
attributions plus six in postdiction), twelve were readily inter-
pretable. This alone is encouraging considering the novelty of 
this uncharted doman. Four of the postdictive factors were es-
sentially replications of four factors in the predictive data. 
This is an encouraging and exciting finding for at least two 
reasons. (1) The varimax rotational procedure used determines the 
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best factor solution according to a statistical criterion (e.g., 
maximizing the squared variance associated with each factor, thus 
distributing factor variance about equally) instead of a subject 
matter criterion. This statistical criterion does not rely upon 
predicted relations between subject matter. Even when two unro-
tated factor matrices have similar structure and pattern loadings 
are subjected to the varimax rotation, the resultant factor mat-
rices need not have similar factor structures due to minute dif-
ferences in variance patterns. Yet, in this data, two-thirds of 
the postdictive factors were replications of predictive factors. 
(2) It has traditionally been unusually difficult to replicate 
factor solutions (particularly low order factors.) 
How should this high percentage of replication be interpreted? 
Recall that the same sample of subjects contributed both sets of 
data. With this in mind, it would suggest two possible interpret-
ations. (1) This replication may be a function of carry over 
effects. That subjects gave similar responses before and after 
the game might suggest that demand characteristics of desired 
stability and consistency operated. (2) This replication may also 
be a testimony to the robustness and pervasiveness of basic attri-
bution processes. However, only alternative methodology, such as 
a between-subjects design, may resolve the question. If there 
were substantial replication using one sample of subjects for the 
predictive attributions and another sample for the postdictive 
attributions, the possibility of carry over effects would be 
eliminated. The degree of replication would then confirm or 
disconfirm the robustness of these processes. 
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One experiment has never been definitive in science, but one 
experiment can surely affect one's confidence in his current ap-
proach. It can also provide a glimpe of light on a previously 
featureless domain. It can provide an impetus for additional in-
quiry with questions begging to be answered. It is hoped that 
this study can fulfill some of the steps necessary for completing 




Attribution theory (really a collection of theories) is pos-
sibly the most rapidly developing facet of social psychology or 
personality science (if the position is granted that personality 
is indeed a social phenomenon) today. One major characteristic 
of attribution theory is its phenomenological data base. It is 
not so much concerned with the real-world-out-there properties, 
as with the person's perception and interpretation of that world 
and of his experiences in it. Not only is man a social animal 
(Aronson, 1972), but man is a thinking, analyzing, and labelling 
social animal. In the broadest sense of the word, attribution 
theory is that theory which describes and explains how a person 
assigns or ascribes perperties, characteristics, and dispositions 
to events, objects, and persons. 
The term •tattribution" is currently used in the personality 
and social psychology literature in at least three contexts. A 
majority deals with causal attributions (i.e., determining the 
causes of behavior or events.) This particular literature is 
voluminous. A second growing area concerns itself with the 
attribution of personality traits or labelling (Messick & Reeder, 
1972; Gormly & Edelberg, 1974}. The third is a catch-all category 
dealing with other types of attributions. This is exemplified in 
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work done by Deci (Deci, ~al., 1974) on attributing motives from 
a knowledge of outputs and rewards. All three types of attribu-
tions were required of the subjects providing the data in the 
present study. 
A major portion of the study was designed to determine if 
predictive causal attributions correspond to postdictive causal 
attributions. A segment of the following discussion directly ad-
dresses and evaluates the current status of the concept of pre-
dictive attributions. Inconsistency in the present data and 
other data has lead to the development of a taxonomy of attribu-
tion tasks. This taxonomy is presented and a theory of attribu-
biasing processes is advanced. 
Status of the Predictive Attribution Concept 
Since a major concern of this study is an appraisal of the 
validity of the predictive attribution concept as presented in 
Chapter 2, the present discussion is intended to determine if the 
concept of predictive attributions has continued merit and de-
served additional experimental investigation. The concept rests 
squarely on Kelley's (1973) principle of covariation; effects are 
attributed to causes with which they covary. One implication of 
covariation is that once the relation of cause-effect is estab-
lished, one piece of information (causes or effects) can be used 
to specify or predict the other piece of information (effects or 
causes, respectively). Traditional attribution tasks have pro-
vided attributors with effect information and the attributor 
assigns the probable cause. This is what we have conceptualized 
as postdictive attributions. If the covariation principle be-
haves as its stati~tical cousins, correlation and covariance, 
then the opposite relation should also occur. In predictive 
attributions, the attributer predicts effects from a knowledge 
of potential causes. 
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Studies of predictive attribution processes are practically 
non-existent. The only known exception is one by Timpe, Merri-
fi~ld, and Helm (1975). The major purpose of that study·was to 
examine the relationship between attitudes and beliefs, and 
attributions. Their study asked low and high Just World (JW) 
belief subjects, who were given scenarios presenting trait inform-
ation about a stimulus person (SP) and a situation description, 
to predict the most likely response to be emitted by SP, and then 
to assign situational and personal causality for the behavior 
predicted. One of their findings was that high JW observers as-
signed greater likability than low JW observers to the SP, but 
the Just World belief did not differentiate actor attributed 
likability. The author suggest that beliefs and attitudes may 
provide observers with mediational information which serves as 
backup data in ambiguous situations. This interpretation will 
be reconsidered and extended in a latter part of this chapter. 
Success and failure perceptions have been shown to underly 
the postdictive attribution process (Weiner, et al., 1971; Ruble, 
1973; and Luginbuhl, ~al., 1975). In the present predictive 
data, the outcome of winning was perceived as a success, and losing 
as failure, a necessary precondition for the present comparison 
of predictive and postdictive attribution. Marginal support for 
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the self-enhancement hypothesis for personal causality was found. 
Actors and observers made different causal attributions depending 
upon their outcomes. Thus, the actor-observer divergence (Jones 
& Nisbett, 1971) was extended; winning actors and losing obser-
vers attributed more personal causality than losing actors or 
winning observers. This attributional divergence changes as a 
function of several other variables. Ruble (1973) has shown 
that actors attribute more situational causality than observers 
for both unsuccessful and successful outcomes; though the diver-
gence is greater for success than failure. Storms (1973) repli-
cated the Jones and ~isbett proposition and found a new wrinkle 
in the proposition. When subjects were re-oriented to the situ-
ation by means of a video tape recording, the attributions were 
re-oriented accordingly. The actors then attributed more person-
al causality than they had before. In the present study, this 
attributional divergence was mediated by self-enhancement tend-
encies and an incentive for success. 
When situational causality was the dependent variable, mar-
ginal support for the actor-observer divergence was also found. 
The actors tended to attribute greater situational causality than 
observers; a second confirmation of the actor-observer divergence. 
However, attributions of situational causality are.unaffected by 
outcome or success manipulations. This is additional support for 
the contention that situational causality and personal causality 
are not the phenomenological opposites implied in some measure-
ment systems. Further work is clearly needed to identify under 
what conditions they are or do behave as opposites. 
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The direct comparisons between predictive and postdictive at-
tribution findings within this study are not as clear and unambig-
uous as hoped. The failure to support previous findings regarding 
postdictive attributions may cast doubt upon the pervasiveness of 
the attribution p:ocess or it may cast doubt upon the current 
methodology. The possibility of carry over effects or fatigue 
effects cannot be ruled out. However, predictive attributions 
did behave in a manner consistent with logic and previou~ post-
dictive studies. The predictive findings are encouraging enough 
for the suggestion that additional studies be conducted to clarify 
the assertion that information summarized in the causal schemata 
can be used both to predict and to postdict. 
Liking and personality evaluations behave in a fairly con-
sistent form in both predictive and postdictive situations. The 
patterning of various attributions follows a consistent and under-
standable form in both predictive and postdictive contexts. But 
since the semantic differential contains only a limited number of 
personality assessment potentials, exploratory and definitive work 
is needed relating other possible traits (Anderson, 1968) to per-
ceptions of success and failure and causal attribution patterns. 
It should be noted that the semantic differential was intended to 
measure meaning, but •rmeanings 11 have not been mapped onto personal-
ity attributions. 
Decisions to accept conceptualizations as valid or to reject 
them as having little utility should always rely on two criteria: 
statistical support and the body of knowledge in general. Even 
though statistical support was not as strong as desired, the trends 
observed herein occurred in the predicted directions, which were 
consistent with other data, and they made logical sense. It 
appears reasonable to recommend that the concept of predictive 
attributions be ascribed the status of deserving additional con-
sideration; it is not yet doomed, or dead. 
A Taxonomy of Causal Attribution Tasks 
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There is an inconsistency between the present data and other 
data. The present study found a reversal of the causal attribu-
tion pattern suggested by Ruble (1973). The causal attributions 
for successful actors in the Ruble (1973) study were largely 
situational, but in our study they were more personally oriented. 
ln addition to this inconsistenGy, several potential biases or 
mediational variables have been suggested. Timpe, Merrifield, and 
Helm (1975) have claimed that belief in a Just World influences 
pttributions. Collins (1974) argues that internal-external locus 
of control is related to attribution patterns, and Fitch (1970) 
found that self-concept mediates causal attributions. How can 
this inconsistency and these biases be accounted for? Are they 
related in some fashion to the type of cognitive activity re-
quired 0£ subjects who provide our data? The following discussion 
pnd taxonomy is an attempt to make sense of several different 
tasks required in attribution theory. 
When an investigator asks a subject to provide causal attri-
bution data, the cognitive processes may vary depending upon the 
sort of attribution required. It is suggested that these experi-
mental tasks parallel or are similar to ones encountered in real 
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life. At least three types of causal attribution tasks can be 
specified: predictive, postdictive scenario, and postdictive in 
situ (postdictive real life). By noting similaries and contrasts 
between these, the processes underlying all types of attributions 
will become more explicit. Figure 5 presents a taxonomy of causal 
attribution tasks and provides comparisons and contrasts on sever-
al dimensions. After each of the basic attribution tasks is des-
cribed, a comparison of these tasks will be undertaken o~ each of 
the dimensions noted in Figure 5. 
Task Description 
In a predictive attribution task, the attributor is supplied 
with information about the upcoming situation (salient aspects of 
that situation) and personal dispositional information about the 
actor. This personal data may take two forms: personality trait 
data or a behavioral history. Given this information, the attri-
b.utor is asked to predict the outcome or a specific behavior to 
be emitted by the actor. The attributor must locate potential 
causes, determining which of these is (or are) most salient, and 
then predict the outcome. Thus, the attributor reasons from 
potential causes to probable effects. A scenario form of predic-
tive attribution was reported by Timpe, Merrifield, and Helm (1975) 
and the present one took the form of requiring predictions in situ. 
In a postdictive attribution task, the attributor is supplied 
with some information about the aptor, certain aspects of the situ-
ation surrounding the actor, and the outcome (effect) is also 
given. The postdictive scenario task is most likely to occur when 
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the attributer is given written (or oral) information about the 
actor and the situation. The attributor's task is to determine 
which possible cause covaries with the noted effects, as required 
by McArthur (1972) and Ruble (1973). 
The postdictive in situ case is characterized by the attribu-
tor actually living through or experiencing the situation in which 
the outcome has already occurred. The attributer must sort 
through the possible causes and determine which cause covaried 
with the outcome; thus, he reasons from observed effects to prob-
able cause. 
The primary characteristic of predictive attribution is that 
the subject must determine (predict) the outcome, while postdictive 
attribution required the subject to determine the most probable 
cause of an event which has already occurred. The current study 
employed an in situ postdictive phase. Fitch (1970) and Storms 
(1973), described in Chapters 2 and 4, also employed the post-
dictive in situ attribution circumstance. 
Type of Experience 
When a subject is required to make a causal attribution, he 
must draw upon his own previous experience to make that attribu-
tion. For predictive and postdictive scenario attribution tasks, 
since the subject does not have direct experience of the event, he 
must rely solely upon previously accumulated experience to deter-
mine the covariation between causes and effects. Thus, predictive 
and postdictive scenario attributions are each based upon previous 
experience. The reliance, however, upon previous experience is 
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diminished in the light of the immediate sensory data available in 
postdictive in situ tasks. Since the experience of the event is 
.current (or immediately preceding the present), past experience 
furnishes less salient information. But, for all cases, causal 
schemata which represent patterns of covariation among impres-
sions experienced in the past must be used. 
Cognitive Processes 
The information available to the attributer in predictive 
and postdictive scenario tasks is likely to be minimal. In a 
typical postdictive scenario task, the total information presented 
to the attributor may be only several sentences or a paragraph. 
Seldom, if ever, is an extensive description of the situation or a 
behavioral history of the actor presented. With this lack of in-
formation and with the nondistinctiveness of cues, the stimuli are 
ambiguous. To interpret these ambiguous stimuli, the attributor 
must project himself into the situation, supplementing this ap-
parent lack of information with data from his past experience. In 
predictive and postdictive scenario attribution, the task is there-
fore projective, in the same sense of the word as in projective 
personality tests (e.g., Thematic Apperception Test, and Rorschach 
inkblots). However, instead of assessing projective cognitive 
processes, postdictive in situ tasks involve the retrospective 
determination of cause. The subject must look back over his 
direct and immediate experience to gain the information necessary 
to make the attribution required. 
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Type of Information 
A common characteristic of all causal attributions is that 
two types or sources of information exist. Two of the dimensions 
of Kelley's (1967; see Figure 1, page 13) ANOVA cube are 11 en-
ti ties't and irtimes/modali ties , 11· representing external and internal 
information, respectively. This 11'times/modali ties1r source could 
be considered behavioral history information. The two sources of 
information which are internal and external for the predictive 
attribution ANOVA (Figure 2, page 17) are 11·traits11 and 11 situ-
ations ,tt respectively. Even in the Weiner, et al. ( 1971) con-· 
ceptualization, these two types of information are available, 
in addition to a stability dimension. These, however, may 
change in relative proportions depending upon the attribution 
task and the presentation of details, or the viewpoint taken. 
Information Provided to the 
Attributor (Input) 
The information input varies according to the attribution 
task. In predictive attribution, information about potential 
causes is given to the attributor. He must then weigh this in-
formation and predict the effect. In both postdictive cases, 
however, the attributor is provided with potential cause data 
plus the effect or outcome. The attributor must then determine 
which potential cause is the probable one. In postdictive tasks 
the attributor has been supplied with relatively more information 
than in predictive tasks. 
Information Provided by the 
Attributor (Output) 
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Once the attributer is given the potential cause information 
in predictive tasks, he must determine what is the most likely 
outcome or behavior. In postdiction, however, as noted above, 
the output required of the attributor is a determination of 
probable cause. Is it internal or external, stable or unstable? 
proportion of the outcome (noted effect) is due to ability, effort, 
task difficulty, and luck (Weiner, et al., 1971)? 
Information Processing Sequence 
The information processing sequence is related to the data 
given to the attributor and to the nature of the attribution 
task. Recall that in predictive attribution tasks, the attributer 
is provided with both situational and trait data. These two 
sources of information constitute two dimensions of the predictive 
ANOVA cube (Figure 2, page 17). Thus, the subject is provided 
with the marginals of the cube, and it becomes his task to deter-
mine the cell entry (the effect) defined by the given marginals. 
The predictor reasons from the ANOVA cube marginals to the ANOVA 
cube cell entries. 
But a reverse sequence characterizes postdictive tasks. The 
attributor must consider the cell entry (i.e., the given effect), 
and determine what combination of causes (the marginals) would be 
most likely to yield the effect. He therefore must use the ANOVA 
cube cell entries to determine the most appropriate combination 
of marginals, the reverse of a predictive task. 
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Loci of Biases 
Luginbuhl, et al. (1975) have summarized the research which 
examines the role of self-concept or self-esteem as a mediational 
influence in the attribution process .. They note that Fitch (1970) 
and other have found support for the mediational role of self-
esteem, while others (Chaikin, 1971; Feather, 1969) have not. The 
present study was initially conceptualized with the underlying 
construct of positive self-esteem mediating all attributions. How-
ever, another interpretation exists; self-esteem may be a £actor 
which biases some attributions under certain conditions, rather 
than an intervening variable mediating all attributions. This 
interpretation, which follows below, constitutes an hypothesis 
(an hypothesis in search of validation) of attribution biasing 
processes. Let it be fully recognized that this hypothesis has 
not been fully or directly tested. It currently represents one 
possible organization and conceptualization of an attribution pro-
cess. 
Biases in Observers. Research which examines the influence 0£ 
attitudinal variables and personality characteristics upon attri-
butions .is scanty. In a study which investigated the effects of 
belie£ in a just world upon the predictive attribution process, 
Timpe, Merrifield, and Helm (1975) observed that this belief dif-
ferentiated observer attributions, but not actor attributions. 
High and low just world observers made attributions consistent 
with their belie£, but relative belief did not affect the attri-
butions of actors. Thus, belie£ in a just world appears as an 
.. 
observer bias. Collins (1974) has reviewed evidence which sug-
gests that the personality variable of internal-external locus 
of control (Rotter, 1966) may also bias observer attributions. 
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When and under what conditions or circumstances will obser-
ver attributions be biased? Figure 6 presents a graphic illustra-
tion of the proposed observer biasing process. Before the obser-
ver biasing hypothesis is discussed, two preliminary comments 
need to be made. 
Previous experience (and its memory) get coded and summarized 
in several forms (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, implicit personality 
theory, and causal schemata). (1} Causal schemata represent the 
accumulated experience of what causes and which effects occur 
together. Causal schemata may be thought of as occurring within 
a cognitive correlation matrix, summarizing cause-effect rela-
tions. Like a correlation coefficient, once the causal schemata 
exists (once the E.. is computed), one new piece of data (score X) 
will permit us to predict another datum (score Y). And symmetry 
is preserved; X can also be predicted from Y. Once causal schemata 
are formed, the subject or individual attributor can anticipate 
probable effects from potential causes (i.e., predictive attribu-
tion) or determine the cause given the effect (i.e., postdictive 
attribution). (2) In the following discussion, the terms "un-
biased causal attribution" and !!biased causal attribution" will 
be used. nunbiased" and "biasedtt are meant as relative and des-
criptive terms, not as absolutes. Biased attributions are those 
which are mediated and influenced by other variables (e.g., belief 














































Figure 6. The Observer Biasing Process Model 
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When an observer is presented with information about the 
situation and trait information in an attribution setting, the 
portion that is perceived is influenced by the feedforward 
biasing influence of expectancies, attitudes, beliefs and per-
sonality effects (Pribram, 1971). The information perceived also 
provides for an automatic updating of expectancies, etc., with 
the new data by means of an information loop. After the observer 
perceives the available information, a decision must be made. 
1ris the information gathered during the perception process suf-
ficient information about the current circumstance to permit a 
valid inference of causality? Is the data distinctive (Kelley's 
use of the term; see Chapter 2)?1t If the observer can answer 
affirmatively, then the new data is considered in light of the 
established causal schemata, and a relatively unbiased attribu-
tion or inference of causality is made. 
But if the data is not distinctive enough, other information 
must be brought to bear on the current information to permit a 
valid inference or attribution~ This. is done by adding batkup 
information which raises distinctiveness, or combines distinct-
ivesnes with consistency or consensus. A. valid inference is pos-
sible without sufficient information distinctiveness if the entity 
behaves the same way over different observations, that is, if it 
behave consistently, or if other attributors concur with the ob-
server's inference, thereby producing consensus. 
Why must the observer use backup information? What is the 
nature of this information? In predictive and postdictive scen-
ario attribution tasks, the observer does not have direct and 
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immediate experience or direct, sensory situational data. The am-
biguity of the cues (the lack of distinctiveness) demands that the 
observer use a projective response, where the response is a par-
tial function of the observer's attitudes, beliefs, and personal-
ity characteristics. Thus, attitudes become important in under-
standing behaviors in novel or ambiguous settings. 
Once the validity of the inference has been increased, the 
original information and the backup information are juxtgposed 
with the causal schemata to yield a biased causal attribution. 
The observer bias hypothesis may be stated as follows: When 
observers encounter ambiguous situations and !!_re forced.!£ make 
attributions, the attributions will be biased, reflecting the 
systematic influence of observer characteristics. 
Biases in Actors. The disputed role of self-esteem as a 
mediational factor has already been briefly discussed. In fact, 
self-esteem probably does not mediate all causal attributions of 
actors. It is advocated here that it is a potential influence, 
but its biasing effects may be triggered by situational implica-
tions. Figure 7 presents a schematic representation of the bias-
ing process in actors. The parallel between Figure 6 and Figure 7 
is intended, and was planned, if only for parsimony. 
The actor is provided with internal (trait) and external 
(situational) information, but the proportion of each is probably 
different from that of observers. As with observers, perceptions 
are biased by a feedforward influence of expectancies, attitudes, 
beliefs, and personality (the traditional definition), and the 




































from the current experience. But the actor must make a different 
decision than the observer. He must decide if the outcome (anti-
cipated or real) can raise or lower his self-esteem or someone 
else's evaluation of himself. "Does the outcome have personal 
relevance? Can he be rewarded or punished for his performance?" 
If the outcome has no significance, he can take the perceived 
information and the established causal schemata, and make an un-
biased attribution of causation. The unbiased causal attribution 
of actors is likely to be more situationally oriented than are 
unbiased observer attributions (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). 
But what if the outcome does have personal relevance to the 
actor? How then are the actor's attributions biased by rewarding 
or punishing outcomes? If the outcomes can affect or reflect upon 
the actor's self-esteem, he will the begin impression management 
tactics (Goffman, 1969; Tedeschi,~~., 1971) or self-enhance-
ment maneuvers (Fitch, 1970). The currently perceived information 
interacts with the causal schemata and causal attributions are made 
in such a way as to preserve or enhance ihe perceived status of 
the actor (to himself or to another person). This biasing con-
cept of self-esteem may account for the finding that in this study 
and in Fitch's (1970) study, self-esteem influenced the actor's 
causal attributions, while in others (Luginbuhl, £.!._ ~., 1975) 
it did not. The studies which have found self-esteem to operate 
on causal attributions either pretested and selected high and low 
self-esteem subjects or rewarded good performance. The studies 
which have not found self-concept influences have made experimental 
participation mandatory for subjects (Luginbuhl, £.!._ ~-, 1975), or 
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rewarded mere participation in research activities, not good 
performance. Hence self-esteem consideration are not activated 
in the subjects who participated in these studies. 
Self-concepts should be relev.a.nt· and active in predictive 
and postdictive in situ tasks, when subjects realize good outcomes 
are rewarded and undesirable behaviors ~re to be avoided. But in 
, 
postdictive scenario studies, the actor is not likely to perceive 
a personal investment or ego-involvement in the studies' .outcomes, 
even though the successfulness or unsuccessfulness of the out-
comes is clearly specified. 
The actor bias hypothesis therefore states: When actors 
encounter a situation in which the outcome can reflect upon the 
Eersonal character of the actor, the actor's attributions will 
be biased, reflecting the systematic influence of self-enhance-
ment ~impression management maneuvers. 
Ruble (1973) observed the actor-observer divergence in both 
success and failure conditions in a postdictive scenario study. 
Our findings, relative to predictive attributions, also confirmed 
an actor-observer divergence. In Ruble's data, actors attributed 
less personal causality than observers did in a failure outcome 
condition. The same trend was also noted in our predictive data. 
In Ruble's data, actors attributed less personal causality than 
observers did for successful outcomes; this trend was even more 
pronounced for success than for failure. This tendency, however, 
reversed in the present data; the successful actors attributed 
more personal causality thari successful observers. How can this 
discrepancy between the present data and that observed by Ruble 
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be explained? The actor bia~ hypothesis offers an explanation. 
Ruble's subjects made their attributions under non-incentive 
conditions, but the present subjects knew about the extra credit 
for success provision, and needing the extra credit, they became 
ego-involved. Thus, Ruble's subjects made unbiased causal attri-
butions, while ours made biased ones. 
Unanswered Issues 
During the course of this study several questions were raised, 
several hypotheses were generated (which attempt to account for 
contradictory findin~s) which could not have been anticipated and 
which remain untested. The following is a brief description and 
listing of areas in which additional experimentation seems war-
ranted. 
(1) In predictive and postdictive scenario attribution tasks, 
since the subject or attributer does not yet have direct and im-
mediate situational, sensory information, it is expected that less 
situational causality will be attributed than in postdictive in 
situ circumstances. A slight tendency confirming this hypothesis 
was found, but due to the nature of the test, it was only approxi-
mate, and deserves a direct, planned comparison. 
(2) In this study and the one reported by Timpe, Merrifield, 
and Helm (1975), attributional differences were found between 
males and females. Luginbuhl, ~ ~· (1975) and Regan, et al . 
. , ··- . 
(1974), however, reported no sex differences, and others have not 
even included sex as an independent variable. It may be that sex 
role stereotypes operate as observer biases. It is proposed that 
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the feminine experience requires heightened situational awareness 
as females are often in control of interpersonal interactions. 
These experiences possibly operate as actor biases. These sex 
differences need to be examined systematically. 
(3) It has already been suggested that the concept of pre-
dictive attribution has enough merit for additional consideration. 
As the robustness of a phenomenon is always judged by its replica-
bility, even so with this concept. 
(4) An observer bias hypothesis and an actor bias hypothesis 
were formulated to account for inconsistencies in various attribu-
tion data. At present these are only post hoc interpretation. A 
direct test of each is needed to determine the validity of each 
biasing model. 
(5) It wai observed that most personality evaluations were 
independent of attributed causality. Except for aggressiveness 
and cooperativeness ratings, they were also independent of out-
come. But the traits assessed in this study provide only a minute 
sample (and an unrandom one, at that) of possible personality 
traits. Other traits may be more directly related to outcomes or 
to other interpersonal behaviors. This is a relatively novel 
area. I~ is still necessary to establish the relationship be-
tween attributed traits and outcomes in order to validate impli-
cations of the observer model of personality. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY 
Personality science has been marked by a lack of theoretical 
progress over the past fifty years. Some (e.g., Fiske, i974) sug-
gest that a reformulation of the personality concept is needed. 
In the present paper, an observer model of pers6nality was formu-
lated. An essential element of this formulation is the observa-
tion that personality is a three component system. Not only is 
there a (1) behaving actor, there is also an (2) observer who 
ascribes (3) traits and dispositions to the actor. This attribu-
tion reflects the observer's reconstruction of the actor and his 
behavior, somewhat independent of the actor's actual character-
istics. The observer interprets his observations of the actor 
in terms of personality traits or labels. Personality does not 
exist without these labels. 
These three components (actot, observer, and attribution) per-
mit a consideration of personality within a well developed attri-
bution theory. Kelley's ANOVA model has provided a starting point 
for the development of this observer model of personality. One 
implication of Kelley's ANOVA model is that causal schemata are 
much like a cognitive correlation matrix, summzarizing cause-
effect relations. If this matrix is, indeed, correlational in 
form, then information can be used in two fashions: predictively 
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and postdictively. Cause can predict effect, or effect can post-
dict cause. A model for predictive attributions is presented, 
tested, and evaluated. It was concluded that the concept of pre-
dictive attributions is useful, and the data is consistent with 
the assumption that the causal schemata are correlational. Pre-
dictive attributions behave in much the same manner as postdictive 
attributions. It was predicted that outcome and viewpoint wo~ld 
interact. This interaction was termed the self-enhancement hypo-
theis; winning actors and losing observers were expected to 
attribute more personal causality for the outcome of the skill 
strategy game than were the losing actors or winning observers. 
This interaction was confirmed. It was also hypothesized that 
the actor-observer divergence would be noted relative to situ-
ational causality; a marginal tendency confirmed this hypothesis. 
A multivariate analysis was used to examine the patterns of 
attributions made by attributors. Personality evaluations were 
independent of causal attributions. Only two personality attri-
butions were related to the actual outcome of the game. Postgame 
perceptions of winners were characterized by attributions of ag-
gressiveness and competitiveness, while losers were viewed as 
cooperative. 
It was assumed that under the incentive-for-winning emphasis, 
positive self-esteem would mediate causal attributions. The pre-
dictive attribution data is consistent with this proposition, 
but this mediational assumption does not account for other re-
search findings. An observer biasing model and an actor biasing 
model are presented which specifies under what conditions attribu-
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tions are likely to be biased by other variables. Finally, sever-
al suggestions as to issues which remain unanswered or unresolved 
are presented. 
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Your Sex: Male or Female (circle one) 
What do you predict your outcome will be? Win 
Rate how confident you are in your prediction. 
very 




8 9 confident 
Rate your predicted outcome on the following scale, by circling the 
number which best represents your estimate. 
very much very much 
a 
failure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a 
success 
What is the probable cause for your outcome? (1) your ability or 
lack of it, (2) your effort of lack of it, (3) task difficulty 
easiness, or (4) luck 
How important will be your personality, traits, character, personal 
style, attitudes, moods, skills, and so on in causing you to have 
the outcome you predicted? 
very unim- very im-
portant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 port.ant 
How stable is your personality, etc., as a cause for your predicted 
outcome? 
very very 
unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 stable 
How important will such factors as the nature of the game, chance, 
the way the other person played, and so on in causing you to have 
your pr~dicted outcome? 
very unim- very im-
portant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 portant 
How stable are these situational factors as a cause for your pre-
dieted outcome? 
very very 
unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 stable 
How much do you like yourself? 
very very 
little 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 much 
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Your Opponent's Sex: Male or Female (circle one) 
What do you predict your opponent's outcome will be? Win or Lose 
Rate how confident you are in this prediction? 
very 
unconfident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
very 
9 confident 
Rate your predicted outcome for your opponent on the following 
scale, by circling the number which best represents your estimate. 
very much very much 
a 
failure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a 
success 
What is the probable cause for your opponent's outcome? 
ability of lack of it, (2) his effort of lack of it, (3} 
ficulty or easiness, or (4) luck 
(.1) his 
task dif-
How important will be your opponent's personality, traits, charac-
ter, personal style, attitudes, moods, skills, and so on in causing 
him to have the outcome you predicted? 
very unim-
portant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
very im-
9 portant 
How stable is his personality, etc., as a cause for his predicted 
outcome? 
very 
unstable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
very 
9 stable 
How important will such factors as the nature of the game, chance, 
the way you played, and so on in causing him to have the outcome 
you predicted? 
very unim-
portant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
very im-
9 portant 
How stable are these situational factors as a cause for his pre-
dicted outcome? 
very 
unstable 1 2 3 4 
How much do you like your opponent? 
very 
little l 2 3 4 
5 6 7 








The postgame segment of the previous questionnaire was iden-
tical to the pregame portion with two exceptions. (1) The confid-
ence rating scales were deleted. (2) Th~ verb tenses were changed 
to reflect the after-the-fact nature of the assessment. The verbs 
were changed from.future tense to past tense. 
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The following is the modified version 0£ the Semantic Di££er-
ential used in this study. The left blank of each bipolar scale 
contains the numeric value 0£ that extreme on the scale; in the 
center blank is an abbreviation which identifies which items con-
tribute to each listed variable (s~e Appendix-B.) On the following 
page the specific instruction sets are provided £or actor and ob-





















_7_: __ : __ :_P_: __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_P_: __ : __ : __ 
_7_: __ : __ :A££ : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ :_:_E __ :, __ : __ : __ 
_7_: __ : __ ~_A __ : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_E_: __ : __ : __ 
_7_: __ : __ :_A __ : __ : __ : __ 
_7_: __ : __ :Aff : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_A __ : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_P_: __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_A __ : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :_E __ : __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :A££ : __ : __ : __ 
7: : :E: : : -- -- -- -- -- -- --_l_: __ : __ : _c __ : __ : __ : __ 
_7_: ___ : __ :_P_: __ : __ : __ 
_l_: __ : __ :Acc : __ : __ : __ 
7 : : :A£f : : : ---- -- --- ---- -- --_l_: __ : __ :_I_: __ : __ : __ 





















Predictive Actor Instructions 
PLEASE rate YOUR Own behavior in the interaction you are 
about to undertake. For each set of descriptive words, 
place a check mark in one of the seven blanks nearest 
the word you believe is most descriptive of YOUR OWN be-
havior. Please mark each set of words whether or not 
they seem to apply to the situation. 
Predictive Observer Instructions 
PLEASE rate the behavior of the OTHER PERSON in the in-
teraction you are about to undertake. For each set of 
two descriptive words, place a check mark in one of the 
seven blanks nearest the word you believe is most char-
acteristic of HIS behavior. Please mark each set of 
words whether or not they seem to apply to the situ-
ation. 
Postdictive Actor Instructions 
PLEASE rate YOUR OWN behavior in the interaction you 
just completed. For each set of two descriptive words, 
place a check mark in one of the seven blanks nearest 
the word you believe is most descriptive of YOUR be-
havior. Please mark each set of words whether or not 
they seem to apply to the situation. 
Postdictive Observer Instructions 
PLEASE rate the behavior of the OTHER PERSON in the in-
teraction you just completed. For each set of two des-
criptive words, place a check mark in one of the seven 
blanks nearest the word you believe is most character-
istic of HIS behavior. Please mark each set of words 
whether or not they seem to apply to the situation. 
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The following variables constituted the independent variables 
in the analysis of variance analysis, the marker variables in the 
factor analysis, and were coded as indicated. 
Sex: Males = level l, Females =level 2 
Opponent's Sex: Same Sex= level 1, Opposite Sex= level 2 
Outcome: Win = level 1, Lose = level 2 
Vi~wpoint: Actor (self) = level 1, Observer (other) = level 2 
The following variables constituted a portion of the dependent 
variables, and were scaled so that n1ir indicated very little, and 
ttgtt indicated very much. These were presented in a Likert format. 
Confidence in Prediction 
Success Rating of Outcome 
Personal Causality 
Stability of Personal Causality 
Situational Causality 
Stability of Situational Causality 
Likability 
The remaining variables were also dependent variables, but were 
presented in a modified Semantic Differential form. They were scor-









Motive (Motive = Affect + Evaluation) 
Capability (Capability = Activity + Potency) 
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